An evaluation of the evolution of attitudes of certain employees of the Waltham Watch Company by Smith, Allen Parker & Johnson, William Heaton
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1950
An evaluation of the evolution of
attitudes of certain employees of
the Waltham Watch Company
Smith, Allen Parker
Boston University
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/5353
Boston University
!I 
I 
It 
I 
.I 
I 
I 
I 
80STON UNIVERSITY 
School of Public Relations 
Thesis 
AN EVALUATION OF THE EVOLUTION OF ATTITUDES OF 
CERTAIN EMPLOYEES OF TEE WALTHAM WATCH COMPANY 
BY 
ALLEN PARKER SMITH 
(A.B., DUKE UNIVERSITY, 1949) 
WILLIAM HEATON JOHNSON, JR. 
(A.B., HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 1949) 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Master of Science 
1950 
I 
II 
li 
!I 
II 
Approved 
by 
First Reader ss:-.&4« f lJ. , ~.-..-.:.,......_ 
~. Professor of Public Relations 
Second Reader 65.~~?'~~---r--
:! 
'I 
II 
I 
_ L_ ____ _ 
--,~---- -
I 
I 
!I 
I 
il 
!I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 
INTRODUCTION •• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The me t hods . ................ . . . . . . . . . . . . 
I. A HISTORY OF TEE WALTHAM WA'l1CH COMPANY. 
II. BIOGRAPHICAL I NTERVIEWS OF WALTHAM 
WATCH EMPLOYEES ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Case A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Case B • •.••...•••••••....••.••..••.••••• 
Case G .• .................................. 
Case D •••••••.••.••.•• ••••••• • • • • • • • • • • • 
Case E • . • . • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Case F • •••••••••••....••..•••••.•••••••• 
Case G • .•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•• 
Gas e H. ~ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Case I .••..•....•..••........•......•.•• 
Case J • ••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Case · K •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Case L • ••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••. 
Case 11 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Case N • • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Case o .. . .............................. . 
Cas e. P ••••.•••.•.•••••••••••••.•• • ••.•.• 
PAGE 
i 
i 
ii 
1 
17 
17 
30 
37 
46 
51 
63 
73 
81 
93 
99 
108 
115 
121 
129 
136 
142 
II 
1\ ,, 
II 
l 
II ll 
II 
I 
CHAP'l'ER PAGE 
I 153 III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ••.•••••••••••••• 
I. The summa.ry • ......•...............• 153 
II. The conclusions ••••.••••••••••.••.• 168 
IV. FINDINGS WHICH RELATE TO PUBLIC 
RELATIONS I N GENERAL •••••••••••••••••• 1'71 
BIBLIOGRAPHY" • ...••.••••••.•.••..••.•••.. iv 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Waltham Watch Company of Waltham, Massachusetts, 
has ceased operations following refusal of the Reconstruc- I, 
II 
tion Finance Corporation, a government agency, to grant the l 
firm's request for an additional loan with which to con-
tinue production of precision time instruments. 
The closing of the company has resulted in extensive 
job layoffs in a community which heretofore has been de-
pendent upon the watch factory for a large proportion of 
the locality's employment. 
THE PROBLEM 
Statement of the problem. It was the purpose of 
this study to investigate the development of attitudes 
within one public effected by the shutdown of The Waltham 
Watch Company; namely, watchmakers who now find themselves 
in an industry which no longer can use their highly tech-
nical services. 
Importance of the study to the field of Public 
Relations. 
(1) The employee interviews which have been 
ed represent the opinions of one public. This public's 
opinions of its company have traced a cumulative opinion 
which developed over a period of time. This study has 
i 
I' 
II 
I 
I 
attempted to discover whether or not the longer certain 
impressions were retained, the more they tended to become 
highly emotional convictions which influenced following 
generations. 
this public are presently derived from current practices of 
management and how much from past conditions. il 
(3) There was the possibility that the technological!! 
knowledge of the experienced watchmakers might afford 
worker opinion of technological advancements overlooked by · 
company management--improvements which might have helped 
the company to survive. 
THE METHODS 
This thesis is headed by a factual history of the 
Waltham Watch Company from the date of its founding through \! 
to the present time. II 
Following the historical introduction are the biog- li 
II raphies of sixteen retired and unemployed Waltham Watch 
craftsmen. These biographies were derived from intensive 
interviews with the subjects at their homes in Waltham, 
Massachusetts. 
This study recognizes that the research method of 
writing a relatively few histories of individuals is 
ii 
II 
I 
I 
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CHAPTER I 
A HISTORY OF 'l1HE WALTHAM WA'l1CH COMPANYl 
The illustrious, and now tragic, existence of the 
Waltham Watch Company commenced in 1850 when Aaron 
Dennison, a Boston watchmaker who foresaw the advantages 
of large-scale production of delicate timepieces within 
one factory, persuaded Boston investors David P. Davis, 
Edward Howard and Samuel Curtis of the merit of his plans. 
These four men merged skill and financing to establish one 
of the three enduring American precision watch manufac-
turing firms. Hamilton and Elgin were Waltham's two 
domestic competitors. 
A century has passed since the first stones were 
placed for the proposed factory building at Roxbury, 
Massachusetts. 
Now, as the Waltham Watch Company was entering its 
centennial year, bankruptcy forced its second shutdown 
within two years on February 5, 1950. The company had 
lThe material for this historical account of the 
Waltham Watch Company was taken from Vincent P. Carosso's 
"The Waltham Watch Company: A Case History" as published 
by the Bulletin of the Business Historical Society 
(Cambridge, December, 1949) and Charles W. Moore's Timing 
a Century: History of the Waltham Watch Company (Cambridge, 
1945). 
1 
reopened its gates in April of 1949 following a loan of 
$6,000,000 from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 
and approximately 1200 workers--out of a total of 2358 
who were dismissed at the first shutdown on December 28, 
1948--were returned to their jobs for an "interim" period 
of operations under the management of President John 
Hagerty. 
But in spite of government assistance, Waltham 
failed. 
For an industry which was at the doorstep of its 
one hundredth year of operation, bankruptcy seemed an 
li 
) 
ignoble end. The firm's long history had seen it rise from 
a mere dream in Aaron Dennison's mind to an almost unchal- , 
lenged position of leadership in the manufacture of time 
and precision instruments. It had enjoyed profitable years 
and suffered lean periods for reasons which are matters of 
conjecture. 
However, one factor in the history of the Waltham 
Watch Company stands forth with extraordinary clarity. 
This factor was the obvious inability of the firm to 
compete profitably on the watch market following World War 
II, whether the real and true reason for collapse be Swiss 
competition, poor quality 0f product, mismanagement, labor 
strife, ·Or failure to successfully reconvert from war 
production. During the years 1945 to 1949, the successive 
2 
I' 
j, 
li 
managements' of Ira c. Guilden~ Paul P. Johnson and John 
Hagerty undid the financial achievements of Frederic c. 
Dumaine, who retired as top executive in 1944 after re-
storing the company to a sound financial position. 
History can hardly prove whether or not the final 
failure was the result of a progressive disease which 
nuFtured its own virus within the Waltham company over ten 
decades. Looking back over the years one can observe that 
bankruptcy was the conclusion of a stormy existence which 
saw many crisis hours interrupt the periods of glory. 
Waltham suffered its first failure almost at birth. 
Aaron Dennison began the manufacture of an eight-day clock 
at the Roxbury site, but his initial product was a failure. 
With risk capital scarce and interest rates high, this 
posed problems for the new company which needed delicate 
machinery for watch manufacturing. Too, the Roxbury site 
was inadequate for the mass production plans of its 
founders, and it had been decided to move the plant to its 
present site at Waltham. 
The future looked brighter when a thirty-six hour 
watch was put in production and proved more successful than 
the earlier clock. 
The plant at Waltham began operations in 1854. 
Dennison managed the plant itself, while Howard--one of the 
original investors--handled the finances. Funds for the 
3 
Waltham land and factory had been gathered by residents of 
the little community and a land speculation company headed 
by Dennison. The company's products found a market through 
Dennison's and Howard's acquaintance with jewelers, but 
Dennison's love of experimenting reduced profits. He was 
not a businessman. 
Vincent Carosso in his article, "The Waltham Watch 
Company: A Case History," recorded the following: 
11The first indication of financial trouble was 
evidenced in October, 1855, when the Waltham Improvement 
Company made a $600 loan to the watch company. The follow-
ing year the watch company was unable to meet its obliga-
tions and borrowed $6,000 on notes guaranteed by the Land 
Company."2 
Business declined as economic conditions became worse 
in the United States during the middle 1850's, and on Feb-
ruary 28, 1857, the directors of the land company voted to I 
foreclose the mortgage. Final bankruptcy came in May, 1857 ,I 
I 
and Royal E. Robbins purchased the company for $56,000 at 1 
sheriff's auction. 
Royal E. Robbins, a watch importer, combined with 
2vincent P. Carosso, "The Waltham Watch Company: A I 
Case History," Bulletin of the Business Historical Society , 1 
XXIII (December, 1949). p:- ~. 1~ 
4 
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I 
Henry A. Robbins and Daniel F. Appleton as partners. The 
new operators were businessmen and, as Carosso puts it, 
"brought to Waltham an efficient, specialized, and prominent
1 
I 
selling organization with mercantile experience in England 1 
and America."3 Dennison stayed on as superintendent for 
five years, but left after this period due to continued 
conflict with Robbins. 
Robbins assumed control of Waltham at a moment when 
both the nation's and the company's economic positions were 
precarious. He began by cutting wages 50 per cent. The 
next year he achieved personal control over the company by 
consolidating the Land Company and the Watch Company. His 
constructive management between 1857 and 1862 found Waltham
1 
prepared for the boom which came with the Civil War. 
War and postwar manufacturing expansion in the 
United States afforded Waltham opportunities which resulted 
in what has been called its "Golden Age." Between 1857 and 
1882, the years which Robbins and his partners controlled 
Waltham, the company enjoyed growth, expansion, and profits. 
In fact, the demand for Waltham watches within the United 
States was so great that the firm did not make efforts to 
send abroad any great number of watches until 1873. The 
3 . Ibid., p. 169. 
5 
Waltham Watch Company matured with the Industrial Revolu-
tion on the domestic front. 
Quite in contrast to the situation today, Waltham 
watches of the Robbins• era overshadowed Swiss competition 
for price, reliability, and accuracy. It was mainly 
Waltham's success which convinced Swiss manufacturers to 
adopt American production techniques. 
A new threat appeared on the scene in the Elgin 
National Watch Company. 
Intense rivalry developed between Waltham and Elgin 
for leadership on the American market. Elgin expanded and 
chose to tempt the consumer with popular priced watches. 
Lashed both by determined foreign and domestic competition~ 
Waltham began to lose its leadership. 
Vincent Carosso points out that Waltham's loss of 
leadership became apparent as the watch market gradually 
was saturated. This meant more vigorous competition for 
the customer, and thus sales became paramount to production. 
Royal E. Robbins was primarily a production man and, with 
antagonism developing between the factory and salesforce, 
it was time for a change in Waltham policy. The problem 
was critical. 
Ezra C. Fitch, manager of the Waltham sales division \ 
in New York, was elevated to general manager in 1883. The 
company, by his choice, declared its intentions to fight 
ii 
I 
I 
6 
7 
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for shrinking markets and control of markets. "The Age of 
IVIerchandising" had arrived for Waltham and was to continue 
until Fitch's departure in 1921. 
Fi t ch realized that the Waltham managements inde-
1 
il 
il 
pendence in selecting styles and prices was at an end. 
Consumer tastes were becoming important to the manufac-
turer; style, variety, and novelty had arrived as vital 
factor in sales. Ezra Fitch accordingly gave leeway to the I 
I 
research departments in multiplying Waltham's number of 
I 
watch styles and movements. II 
II The decline was halted, but no notable progress was I, 
achieved. 
There were no bright hours of profitable business 
for the Waltham Watch Company until the general economic 
recovery which followed the election of President McKinley 
in 1896. Prior to the election, the company had tried to 
ill 
I 
I 
I preserve itself by half hearted participation in a weak 1 
trade association called The National Association of Jobber~\ 
in American Watches. The organization collapsed after a 1 11
1 stormy career, meanwhile, competition was renewed with a 
fiendish vigor and the depression of the mid-1880's set in. 11
1 McKinley's election and the discovery of gold in I
Alaska opened a period which saw Waltham enjoy new pros- I 
perity. Boosted production and greater efficiency were 
probably factors, although Vincent Carosso points out that 
--lr 
II 
li 
I 
I 
• 
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price-fixing in the industry may have been responsible to 
a degree. 
Financial capitalism, an economic element of the 
times, began to wane as Theodore Roosevelt's "New National·· 1 
I 
ism" came to the fore and the government's attitude changed 
toward uncontrolled business activities. Waltham's profits : 
II 
slipped noticeably and could be attributed--in addition to 11 
I 
new governmental policy--to reappearing waste and extrava- 11 
gance, increasing discontent 1 and management's decline in :1 
strength and efficiency. 
Waltham's profits disappeared to such a degree that 
the company's stockholders decided it was time for action. 
In 1907, the stockholders 1 led by c.c. Buckley 1 revolted 
and forced election of a new board of directors. Man~ge­
ment was given to a committee of directors. And, if that 
was not sufficient, strained relations arose between Fitch 11 
and -Royal R. Robbins 1 treasurer and son of Royal E. Robbins . 11 
d 
I World War I temporarily saved the Waltham Watch 
Company from its financial plight 1 but postwar declines in 
business brought its ailments to light. By 1921 the 
company owed $8,000,000--and its $11,000 1 000 inventory was 1
1 
actually worth about $4,000,000. Too, the plant was prepa~] 
I; 
ed for production of pocket watches, whereas the market 
demand was turning towards wrist watches. Two-thirds of 
its equipment was idled as Waltham failed to meet 
competition. 
Waltham now needed new financing for alteration of 
production and merchandising policies. 
The era of Frederic C. Dumaine was at hand. 
In 1922 the banks concerned in Waltham's impending 
failure asked Kidder, Peabody and Company to direct 
Waltham's refinancing. The firm immediately chose Frederic 
c. Dumaine, former top executive of the Amoskeag Manufac-
turing Company of Manchester, New Hampshire, as president. 
Dumaine gave $125,000 for 12,500 shares of Class A common 
stock in the factory. 
Dumaine wasted no time in setting out to remedy 
Waltham's ills. Said Mr. Carosso: 
"A determined realist, Dumaine brought Waltham the 
advantages of financial capitalism without destroying the 
efficiencies of industrial capitalism."4 
Dumaine began by attempting to reduce all costs. He 
emphasized economy and factory discipline. He centralized 
control as much as possible, did away with almost all re-
search and advertising spending, and cut his salesforce to 
the core. 
II Charles W. Moore, author of Timing a Century, wrote 
'I 1, 
II 4 Ib1d.' P• 1'76. 
tl 'II ~ J 
II 
I 
~ 
I 
' I 
I 
I 
1: 
this of the Dun~ine management: 
"The Dumaine management was proud of the absence of 
any 'system' of controls. There were no charts, no volu-
minous reports, no bulky files of forms and records. But 
if one wished to know any of the essential figures (since 
1923) of performance or cost, he could find them in a 
series of some half-dozen looseleaf books, indexed for 
easy reference."5 
Dumaine also attempted to readjust wages, with many 
of the employees receiving reductions in pay. The result 
was rebellion by a segment of the Waltham company's workers 
and the famed five month strike of 1924. "The company won 
the strike after five months, but morale remained low and 
even today Waltham is suffering from its victory," wrote 
Carosso. 
Waltham's profits were high in 1925 and 1926, but 
began to decline in 1927. Competition from foreign and 
domestic producers may be one reason for the slackening of 
net income, poor accounting controls, inferior merchandis-
ing policies, and failure with innovations must also be 
considered. The Great Depression also loaned its i mpact to / 
I 
5charles W. Moore, Timing~ Century: History of the . 
Waltham Watch Company (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 
1945), p. 158. 
10 
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I 
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I 
I 
Waltham's waning successes. 
Charles Moore wrote: I I 
I 
Im- I 
provement was made, but there were many reverses and Duma~ 
"Quality was Dumaine's most vexing problem. 
felt them keenlj ••• "6 \ 
Waltham's ability to compete on the market received 
a setback during the Dumaine mana gement when the company 
was beset with complaints from jewelers and customers re-
garding the quality of the product. Dumaine commented in 
a letter to Ezra Fitch: "Continued and persistant criticism 
of. quality of output are most disconcerting and unless 
discontinued must end in disaster."7 
As the 1930's progressed, the company--regrettably 
slow at introducing new ideas--again altered policy. In 
1938 and 1939 1 personnel policies were remolded in order 
to obtain better trained employees, the inventory was re-
duced, efforts were made to install new and better machines 
and the speedometer being produced was improved. Wholesale 
and retail prices were readjusted to appease distributors 
and retail jewelers. 
6Ibid., p. 167. 
7Loc. cit. 
11 
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World War II then broke, and Waltham devoted itself 
largely to government military production. Commercial 
sales slumped from 56 per cent of sales in 1942 to 5 per 
cent in '44, and the American watch market was laid almost 
entirely bare to Swiss imports. 
Frederic c. Dumaine sold his interests in the 
Waltham Watch Company in 1944 with virtually all his hold-
ings being purchased by Ira C. Guilden, former vice presi-
dent and director of the Bulova Watch Company and director 
and chairman of the Trade Bank and Trust Company of New 
York City. Dumaine's management at Waltham was notable. 
Having taken a firm valued at $4,000,000, he made it pay 
·I 
$24,000,000 in t wenty years and retired $ 6,000,000 in bonds I 
and debentures. He departed from Waltham at a moment when 1' 
postwar reconversion loomed as a problem of crucial impor-
tance. 
Guilden expected reconversion to be hurriedly 
achieved, and, as author Carosso points out, he chose to 
keep the factory operating on a limited basis rather than 
to shutdown for complete readjustment to peacetime produc-
tion. His hopes were not realized and by September, 1946, 
the company was unable to meet its quota of 1500 movements 
per day. Waltham's failure threw the 1946 student commenc~· 
ment sales to its more energetic competitors, Elgin and 
d Hamilton. It is interesting to note that in 1946 80 per 
.,. 
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I 
cent of Waltham's production remained in men's styles, 
whereas 1945 market surveys, according to Carosso, showed 
61 per cent of the sales were women's watches. 
Slow deli very of badly-needed machinery also delayedJI 
postwar production, and Guilden attempted to rectify this II 
shortcoming by purchases of necessary machines in Switzer- 1 
land. He failed. Meanwhile, loss of production by employ- \! 
ees, who were kept at work by Guilden's desire not to 
shutdown for reconversion, was causing high production 
costs per movement. 
Guilden, who was primarily a marketing man, broke · 
tradition by abandoning the policy of distributing Waltham 
watches through restricted lists of wholesalers or jobbers. ,I 
Sales to retailers were to be handled by a company sales 
force. To place the firm's name before the public, he 
reversed Dumaine's policy on advertising and launched a 
$500 1 000 advertising campaign in 1946. 
Guilden's efforts were in vain. Wrote Carosso: 
1
1 
What Wal tham il "Guilden is primarily a marketing man. 
needed in 1945 was a production man who could expedite 
reconversion, stimulate production, and re-tool for the 
postwar market. It was the recognition of these needs that ' 
caused Guilden to resign. 11 8 
Bcarosso, ££· cit., p. 180. 
I 
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Paul P. Johnson, who succeeded Guilden in June, 
1948, was production minded. He desired a quick analysis 
of Waltham's manufacturing costs through use of time 
studies, and he concluded that appreciably reduced costs 
could only come with increased volume of production. Pre-
liminary time studies proved that Waltham was a high cost 
producer. 
Johnson cut the supervisory force, halted excessive 
overtime, and placed planning and production under a single li 
executive who worked with both management and the purchas-
ing department. Costs fell appreciably, but it became 
obvious that marketing and merchandising policies also had !I 
I 
to be overhauled. He accordingly abandoned pressure sell- Ill 
ing and gave increased attention to production of low li 
,: 
priced watches. But an effective salesforce still was 1 
lacking. 
\! Waltham's inventory grew as production increased and !I 
I 
sales lagged. In June, 1948, J"ohnson informed union 
President Walter W. Cenerazzo that the factory would have \ 
to close for an indefinite period. Johnson felt that ;\ 
business conditions and sales of the inventory should 
determine the logical reopening date. However, Cenerazzo 
insisted that a specific date for reopening be set and 
re-enforced his demand with a threatened refusal to reopen 
the labor contract--which still had a year and a half to 
14 
II 
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li 
run--to permit badly needed piece rate studies. 
Carosso wrote: 
"Finally, therefore, Johnson gave way, admitting to 
himself that he was being forced to sacrifice what he 
considered the long-run interests of the company for the 
short-run interests of one group in the company--its 
employees."9 
Johnson also faced financial difficulties. The 
' 
'I . 
I 
II 
\I I 
bank debt soared to $ 5,000,000 (of which $3,500,000 were in. ll 
demand notes) as a recapitalization plan approved by the li 
,, 
stockholders in August, 1948, sought $500,000 in time bank .I 
notes by mortgaging the company 1 s plant and equipment. The !\ 
money served Waltham's immediate monetary needs but did not 11 
'l afford the vital long-term financing for remaking of pro- !1 
duct ion and merchandising policies. !1 
II 
The banks now refused further loans, and Johnson was il 
II 
forced to make overtures to the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation. The RFC did not react favorably, and the 
banks, learning of this, reconsidered their stand and 
announced they would support Waltham for the first two 
months of 1949. This would have necessitated following 
Johnson's plan for curtailed operations. It was then that 
9rbid., p. 183. 
II 
I 
15 
union president Cenerazzo decided to approach the RFC 
personally and ask reconsideration of its refusal. 
The RFC indicated that Waltham should file under 
II 
J 
the bankruptcy laws which, after a short delay, the companyj 
did on December 28, 1948. The RFC then was ready to discuss! 
II 
refinancing with the Waltham trustees. Meanwhile, employ- I 
ees of the Waltham Watch Company were idled for more than 1j 
three months as the factory was shut down. !I 
In April, 1949, the RFC awarded a $6,000,000 loan 
to Waltham and John Hagerty, himself the former RFC Com-
missioner at Boston, was named president of the company. 
Production resumed under Hagerty's management, but by 
February 5, 1950, operations again ceased as Waltham's 
financial precariousness continued unabetted. 
The future of the Waltham Watch Company now lies 
with the decisions of Federal Courts, where three plans of 
reorganization are being considered, as Waltham's 2300 
jobless watchworkers are following the legal precedings I: 
II 
I
I 
which will determine whether the company's long history is 
to continue--or is at an endl j 
I 
'I 
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CHAPTER II 11 
il 
BIOGRAPHICAL INTERVIEWS OF WALTHAM WATCH EMPLOYEES 
II 
CASE A 
The subject referred to herein as Case A became em-
ployed with the Waltham Watch Company in 1899 as an office 
boy in the dial department. Born and raised in the Waltham i 
community during the company's most flourishing period, 
Case A began a tenure of 47 years with Waltham Watch during 
the presidency of Ezra Fitch (1883-1921). 
The eminence and prestige automatically associated 
with employment in the Waltham firm attributed to one's 
social standing within the community, according to Case A. 
"The Waltham Watch plant was always a premium to get ' 
i 
in," the subject said. "I can remember it was there •way 
back when I was a kid. And it was always regarded as the 
nicest place to work. Why, you were supposed to wear a 
tall hat if you worked for Waltham." 
Case A related that it required influence on "the 
inside" to get a job with the watch company. And he him-
self had this prerequisite. Once employed, any worker I 
I 
virtually was assured of a better than average income and a I 
I 
respectable status among the residents of the Waltham town. 
"My father didn't work for the watch company, and, 
just to show you the difference, he was still making 
I 
·r-
1 
eighteen dollars a week when I was making twenty-one." 
As an office boy in the dial department, Case A's 
first wage rate was five cents an hour for a 58-hour week. 
He continued on that particular job for three months before 
being assigned to "the bench" on an upright lathe which made 
watch dials. His wages on "the bench" were $12 a week. By 
1908 he was making $15 per week. 
A minor panic occurred in the nation's economy in 
1908. Case A recalled that the watch company was forced to 
make reductions in its labor force as a result. There was 
no union existent at the time, and the layoffs were arbi-
trary. 
"They (the company) were very considerate. The 
married men were kept on the job, and us young fellows were 
let go. We were fortunate that the panic only lasted about 
nine months. 
"Mr. Fitch was president then. We all liked him 
because he was such a very lovable fellow. You could go 
into his office anytime, sit down, and tell him your trou-
bles. And he would listen sympathetically." 
Case A was recalled to work at Waltham after the 
panic layoff period of nine months. He was reemployed at 
"sinking" dials and later became "job master" at "burning 
out" dials. As "job master," he supervised twelve employ-
ees. 
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"My work continued steady right up to the time the ,I 
war (World War I) came. Then we began working day and night 1J 
. I 
making Army and Navy watches and airplane clocks. We were 
working forty-eight hours a week and, with extra overtime, 
most of us were making real money." 
vVhen the first World War ended, Case A was promoted 
into the company office as an assistant foreman in produc-
tion control. 
"After the war we didn't seem to get back on our 
feet. Production seemed to lag for some reason. I think 
the reason was that the big money made on war overtime 
stopped. People just weren't making as much money, they 
weren't producing as much, and what you might call dissat-
isfaction appeared to set in. It's pretty hard to drop 
from a hundred do~lars a week to thirty-five---and our 
production seemed to drop back with it." 
back 
The Waltham Watch Company had begun the postwar 
decline which later led to the change in management ele-
vating Frederic c. Dumaine to the firm's top executive 
position. 
I 
I 
I 
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Said Case A of the critical postwar slump at Waltham:l 
"There was mismanagement. You can quote me on that I 
because I know. I was working right with them. Old man I 
. II Fitch was grooming his son to take over as president when he: 
I 
retired, and the son was nothing but a playboy. He didn't I ! 
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have any interest in the plant." 
The subject, who continued employment in the 
company's production control office, said that the firm 
sank deeply into debt---a debt which reached $8,000,000 
by 1923. Management attempted to correct production 
flaws by summoning efficiency experts from New York for 
studies of the plant's operations. 
"A million dollars went for some efficiency tests 
by a New York firm---time studies and such. Time studies 
are a good thing, I think, but I didn't like it the way 
they were doing it. Those so-called experts weren't 
capable of coming into a watch company. Maybe a steel 
company, but not a watch. Our work was too fine and 
precise for studies like that." 
Indicative of the feelings towards general manage-
ment during this particular period was Case A's claim 
that conditions within Waltham would have been "much 
better" had the company employed "good foremen and super-
intendents." 
His opinions were frank: 
"There was too much favoritism in the plant at that'l 
I 
time. 
I 
I Who your friends were counted to a great extent~ 1 
and good men who could have straightened things out re-
mained at the bench. Those who had the pull got ahead." 
The efficiency experts hopefully employed by 
'============-~= 
Waltham "couldn't bring it back." And by 1923 it was the 
feeling of most employees that the company's closure was at 1 
hand. However, Frederic c. Dumaine---acting through Kidder,
1 Peabody and Co.---assumed control of Waltham Watch to save , 
it from bankruptcy at the eleventh hour. 
Emphasis on Dumaine's popularity at Waltham Watch 
was recurrent in Case A's conversation. 
"Mr. Dumaine started right in and took the company 
out of the red himself. He was the main factor in saving 
Waltham Watch. He paid the debt off and put people back to 
I! 
II I~ 
I 
work-~-and what more could you ask? I He was a very hard task, 
master, but he was honest, on-the-level, and paid you what 
you were worth." 
The respondent recalled that Dumaine dismissed 
"nearly fifty executives" during his first three years as 
president. He "played no favorites." One of Dumaine's 
techniques for keeping his subordinates "alive" was to get 
them "fighting among themselves to keep up spirit." 
Case A was promoted to a top executive position in 
production in August, 1925. He proudly pointed out that by 
1929 Waltham Watch had doubled its production of movements. 
The future appeared much brighter for the 2700 employees. 
Then the Great Depression descended on Waltham. 
I 
"Mr. Dumaine didn't seem to realize that the panic of l 
1929 was going to be so severe," said Case A. "He kept ful l I 
21 
crews working at the plant until May 15 of 1930, thinking 
that when the panic was over people would have money again 
and we would have the watches they wanted. We accumulated 
seven hundred thousand watches. 
"Then Mr. Dumaine realized that the depression wasn't
1 
going to be over in a short period. Layoffs were started. II 
He didn't want to lay anyone off, but he was compelled to djl 
. I 
it. We had to reduce the force to around two hundred I 
workers. It was that way for a full year---just a skeleton ! 
crew." 
Case A remembered that Dumaine hoped to return more I 
people to their jobs and clear some of Waltham's vast inven-1 
tory by reducing the price of watches as drastically as 
possible. Some time pieces were sold at five dollars. 
But never did Dumaine's concern for the workers 
obstruct his insistence on red11cing all unnecessary over-
head costs. 
"Mr. Dumaine was always strict on overhead. If he 
went into an office, he's often openly question whether all 1 
I 
the girls he saw around were needed. And he never hired an 
executive who couldn't produce." 
Case A saw the depression era for Waltham Watch begin 
subsiding in July, 1932, when he received a telegram re-
questing his return to the plant for establishment of new 
production schedules. Shortly afterwards, idle employees 
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steadily were recalled. 
"From then on Mr. Dumaine kept the factory going, 
selling watches. And people didn't have to loaf up until 
the time of the war (World War II)." 
Case A offered willing explanation regarding an 
alleged reduction in the quality of Waltham watches during 
the Dumaine period of management. 
"He (Mr. Dumaine) tried to reduce mainspring costs 
on watches by substituting American steel for Athenia 
Swedish steel. The American steel was far inferior, and it 
would snap easily. We had to take back thousands of our 
watches and change the springs. It hurt us, and I guess our 
reputation suffered quite a bit. 
"Mr. Dumaine was pretty sore about the mainspring 
episode. He was a financier and not a watchmaker. But he 
didn't know himself that American steel would snap the way 
it did." 
, 
The importance of mainsprings to Waltham Watch was 
emphasized by Case A, who pointed out that the company 
manufactured "better than half the world total" at one time. 
The mainspring department had long been known as "the pay-
I 
roll" throughout the fac~ory. 
With the advent of World War II, the 
ment controlled full production at Waltham. 
national governJ 
The company 
made precision movements for the Army and Navy, and, as Case ! 
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I A said, "we were not allowed to make a civilian watch for 
the duration of the war." 
Case A believed World War II gave Swiss watchmakers 
a strangle hold on the American market which later attri-
buted to the eventual bankruptcy of Waltham. 
"The Swiss people, with a low tariff and our in-
ability to make watches, stepped in and took over the trade. 
The Swiss grab on our market is one of the main reasons why 
we're in the position we are today. I 1ve talked to lots of 
jewelers who said they've done well with Swiss watches, so 
why go back to anything else?" 
As for Case A's suggestions: 
"The only thing which will help the Waltham Watch 
Company is for the American president, the Senate, and the 
House to put on a tariff which will protect the American 
firms. When they say that Hamilton and Elgin are able to 
compete, I know for a fact that those two firms are keeping 
alive by operating half-time." 
Frederic c. Dumaine departed as president of Waltham I 
Watch in 1944, which meant that the firm was to face postwar! 
reconversion under Ira c. Guilden. Why did Dumaine sell out! 
his interests at such a profitable period in the firm's 
existence? 
"The real reason he left was that he got sick of 
doing business with the union. I 1m not criticizing unions; 
24 
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we need them. But perpetual union troubles was one of the 
things which hurt Waltham Watch. This (union agitation), 
Swiss competition, and American indifference to the types 
of watches they bought ruined Waltham." 
I 
Case A, who was situated in a high executive position, 
pointed out that Dumaine handed over a solvent company to i 
the incoming Mr. Guilden. He left capital of $3,000,000· 
for Guilden "to play with." This was after a certain per-
centage of profits was distributed among Dumaine's execu-
tives as farewell "bonuses." I 
"When Mr. Guilden came, he promised he would sell alll 
the watches we made. He knew nothing about manufacturing; I 
he was a salesman. I might point out that he had interests i 
in Swiss watch factories, too, and it wasn't long before he 
started placing orders for Swiss materials. He had quite a 
little trouble with the union on account of that." 
The respondent said that orders for millions of 
dollars were placed with the Swiss interests by Guilden. 
These orders called for parts including pinions and balance 
wheels---parts which Waltham previously had made for its 
own use. 
"Mr. Guilden brought in some different men with him. 
He put fifty thousand do l lar a year executives to work, 
opened a suite in the Ritz-Carlton in New York, and the llkeJ 
I 
And the sad part of it all---when he went out looking for ! 
25 
trade for our watches, he couldn't sell them because of the 
keen Swiss competition." 
Case A retired from Waltham Watch in October, 1946, 
after 47 years of service. But his interest in the plight 
of the firm did not subside with his departure. 
"From then on, I can only tell you what they tell me. 
I do want to tell you this. When the RFG (Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation) took over, they took this Hagerty 
(John Hagerty) on as president at thirty thousand dollars 
a year after he got the loan. He was only making ten 
thousand with the R.F.C. 
"That was another of the things which put Waltham 
where it is today. Hagerty didn't know anything about 
watches. He was just a politician, and he didn't help the 
company at all." 
Case A charged that the federal government's failure 
to grant the additional $2,000,000 of a $6,000,000 loan 
forced closure of Waltham Watch. He claimed there was 
insufficient reason for the plant to shut down in February, 
1950, since "we had plenty of orders and were ready to go." 
He believed the company would be operating today had the 
government advanced the additional $2,000,000 which had been , 
I 
"promised." 
He accused: 
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"The Swiss people, who contributed heavily to the----~--
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Truman campaign fund, went quickly to Washington for an 
audience with Truman after he appeared favorable to the 
Waltham loan. Three days later, Waltham representatives 
were told by Truman that he couldn't do anything for them. 
It was all true that the Swiss firms and their controlling 
interests told Truman to lay off." 
Case A declared that Hagerty dealt Waltham Watch's 
retail good will an irreparable loss by ~isposing of large 
II 
II 
)) 
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inventories through surprise half-price sales held in Boston 
(Wm. Filene's and Sons), Houston, and Chicago. 
"The jewelers in Boston became indignant, and to this 
day I hear them swear they'll never take Waltham watches 
again. That trick dropped June, 1949, graduation business 
for the jewelers around here to almost nothing. Why, it 
took two policemen and four lines to keep the crowds in 
I 
I 
Filene's in order. And Hagerty was the one who pulled thatJ11 
The subject, asked about the Waltham strike of. 1924, 
offered his version of the event. He was employed in the 
executive offices at the time. 
"That strike never should have started. It didn't 
gain a thing for anybody. The workers had been asking a 
ten percent wage increase, and Mr. Dumaine wanted to com-
promise and give them five. The strike started August 11, 
1924, and lasted until January 13, 1925. The strikers 
realized they had made a mistake. The ones who agitated 
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the strike actually were the ones who were making the big 
money." 
Asked if the strike appeared to have any after-
effects on employee morale and attitudes about the company, 
Case A replied that he was unaware of any decline in job or 11 
I 
institutional pride on the parts of the workers. I. 
Also, he saw no relationship between the strike and :I 
an earlier wage readjustment program carried through by J 
Dumaine---a program which saw some workers' wages raised 
and others' lowered. 
In regard to Waltham's alleged failure to meet the 
public demand for women's watches, the respondent said that 
the company did not start making this style of watch until 
after World War I. He declared that just prior to World 
War II Waltham's production was about 60 percent women's 
watchea---"I think." 
"We didn't lag behind American trade on women's 
watches too much. 
by quite a ways." 
But I do know that the Swiss beat us all i 
i 
Case A admitted a difference in attitude and morale 
at Waltham Watch after the departure of Dumaine. 
"The people just didn't feel the same under Mr. 
Guilden as they did under Mr. Dumaine. Under Mr. Dumaine, 
we all felt that there was a secure foundation under the 
whole plant---something we haven't known since. I guess 
28 
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that's why everybody wants Mr. Dumaine to come back now. 
He can straighten things out." 
Case A firmly denied that the Dumaine era at Waltham 
had given birth to less of "a will to produce" on the parts 
of employees. He reiterated his ideas about the faith and 
confidence which Waltham employees felt in their president 
during that period. 
What of Waltham tools? 
Are they outmoded and badly depreciated? 
. I 
The subject, who bad served almost half a century in : 
the watchmaking trade, declared: 
"As for equipment, I will say that they (Waltham) 
I 
It's my own opinion 
I 
have the finest equipment in the world. 
that they could get the place into top order right now on 
fifty thousand dollars1" 
29 
CASE B 
Case B---white-haired, 80 years of age, and bothered 
by lapses of memory---covets a jeweled gold watch which was 
given to her on March 9, 1900, after selection by Waltham 
Watch employees as "the most popular girl in the plant." 
The presentation was made ten years after she had 
gone to work for the company on March 1, 1890. Her service 
with Waltham was to continue for fifty-nine years, unin-
terrupted but for a three months' rest necessitated by a 
stroke in 1943. 
No important part of her life can be isolated from 
the Waltham community and the watch company. She was one 
of a family of six children, four of which became employees 
of the watch firm. 
"I was born right here in Waltham, and I never lived 
anywhere else," she boasts. "I went to school here and 
everything." 
Case B became employed with Waltham Watch at the age 1 
of twenty: "You had to be twenty to work at Waltham." She 
believes that everyone who was working at the plant when 
she started employment {at least in the departments with 
11 which she was familiar) now is dead. 
i "The firm was considered a wonderful place to work, 
1! and everybody wanted to work there. You had to be first 
I 
\, class in order to get in there." 
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Case B 's first job at the watch factory was "setting-!\ 
up," which was 
of materials. 
I 
the process of assembling the assorted piecesl
1 
She worked at "setting-up" for two years, j 
then became an instructress or "teacher" Of her skill. II 
"I taught all the men and all the women how to set- I 
up watches. I must have taught for about thirty-five years, 
then I went to inspecting full-time. I had done some in-
specting before between teaching periods." I 
Case B's tenure .at teaching ended three years after 
I
I 
Frederic C. Dumaine became president of Waltham Watch. Hel" j 
early years with the company had been served under the I. 
I 
management of Ezra Fitch, of whom she said: 
"We all knew him personally. He was a lovely, 
friendly man. His sons worked there, too, and they were 
nice men." 
Case B's forced change from instruction at "setting- 1 
up" to inspection of finished movements coincided with the 
strike of 1924. She was indifferent about the strike and 
denied that her wages were affected by the episode. 
"I went out when the rest of them did, but I didn't 
take any part in the strike. I just wanted the company to 
keep going. Some stayed in the plant, but I didn't." 
.The arrival of Dumaine's reorganization of the 
Waltham company possible could be connected with .Case B's 
shift from an instructor to an inspector. However, she 
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could not see any association between the two occurrences. 
It became obvious during the interview that her knowledge 
or concern with managerial policies or employee problems 
was virtually nil. Such matters were "the foremen's 
worries." 
1 
"My teaching at setting-up ended with the strike in 1 
that year, They didn't tell me why they stopped it (her II 
I job). They reorganized the system, and the job I had went 1 
to someone else. 
"I didn't notice much change after Mr. Dumaine came 
in to replace Mr. Fitch. But then, nothing was really 
interesting to me except to go in and do rey work, I haven•til 
anything to say about any of them except that they've been 1'
1 
good to me---from Mr. Fitch right on down." 
1
1 
Case B explained her duties as an inspector. I 
"When I inspected a watch, I would wind it up first, , 
then let it run down---to see if it worked all right. Afterl1 
that, with my glass in my eye, I would look for all the I 
'side shakes.t" 
What Case B 
I 
termed "side shakes• was the tendency for i 
balanced wheels to "wiggle" if they were not properly set 
in place. She had to "look for everything like that in the 
barrels and in the wheels." In addition, she had to scru-
tinize each movement for scratches on the plates. 
"And some of the girls and boys could scratch!" said 
I 
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Case B. 
"We'd get quite a few of them withWeacsreandtchitead.ownif ~~ 
it had a scratch, we wouldn't let it go. I 
and have it refinished." I 
She was employed as an inspector during the Dumaine 
era when the ill-fated effort was made to substitute Amer-
ican steel for Swedish steel in the production of Waltham 
mainsprings (see interview of Case A}. Asked her opinions 
about this alleged reduction of quality in the Waltham time-1 
piece, Case B said: 
1
1 
"I wouldn't know anything about the mainspring. TheY 
were done in another department. All I know is that the 
mainspring would be all right when it came to me." 
As a watch expert, what was her opinion of Waltham's 
general quality over the years? 
"I always remember Waltham watches as first quality. 
We always made them the same way, except, of course, for 
the different sizes. You couldn't beat them." 
Case B worked at inspecting "up until I was about 
seventy." (This approximately would have been 1939 or 
I 
1940---the subject had extreme difficulty recalling names 1 
and dates.) II 
"Then the company was going to dismiss me. I suppos~\ 
they thought I was too old to work. But, Mr. Cenerazzo ~~ 
(Walter W.) came and told me not to move from where I was. I 
He said I could stay there as long as I wanted to." 
The union leader's influence apparently perpetuated l1 
Case B's employment at Waltham Watch. The company reversed 
its intentions of dismissing her, and the subject remained 
at work "looking over tags and checking the girls' work." 
Aside from the mentioned incident, Case B had little 
association with the employees' union at Waltham. 
"I belonged to the union, but I never went to any of 
the meetings. I just paid my dues and never bothered to go. 
As for Mr. Cenerazzo, I want to say that he is one of the 
loveliest men I have ever met. Very lovelyJ" 
I 
1 
The frail old lady known here as Case B remained at 
work until the company underwent its first bankruptcy shut- 1: 
down in December, 1948. At the age of 78 1 she was reporti~ 
for work each morning at 8 a.m. and remaining at her "job" 
until 3:30 p.m. 
She found that her career with Waltham was at an end 
when the company reopened under the management of John 
Hagerty. 
"It (the company) opened again, and many were called. 
back. But they didn't call me backJ" She made the last 11 
statement with a perplexed shake of her head, as if it were 
impossible to comprehend how Waltham Watch might operate 
without her veteran skill. 
The loyalty and devotion of this aged woman to the 
company was impressive. As she says: "The company has been 
li 
II 
I' 
II 
II 
I 
3 4 
\I 
I 
I 
II 
I 
my life." She remembered that she made heroic efforts to 1
1
. 
return to her work after a layoff of three months following i 
a stroke in 1943. She fondly recalled that her foreman--- 1j 
"I wish I could think of his namel"---would call for her in I 
his car on "bad mornings," which is exemplary of the mother-
ly attention given the elderly lady by her plant associates • . 
"I was taken up and down in the elevator and treated 
royally!" 
The interviewer, hoping to unveil any approving or 
dissenting attitudes about management from the subject, 
questioned her as to the years which she most cherished 
during her long employment with the Waltham company. 
"They (the years} were all lovely. They were just 
wonderful to me. And the wages were good. I know that I 
got very good wages." 
She proudly boasts that her "tools are still there." 
She took "awfully good care of them," and when she left the 
company she "still had some which I started with." 
Had she noticed any methods by which Waltham might 
have bettered its product or improved production processes? 
"I wasn't in a position to see any manner in which 
the watches could be improved. The 'finishers' would be 
the ones who could do that. I do recall that there were 
heavy periods of production; then there were some slack 
periods. But, I don't know anything about that." 
35 
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li She lives with the fervent hope that the Waltham 
Watch Company will renew operations within her lifetime. 
She, at 80 years of age, dreams that someday she will be 
called back to her "job." She cannot understand why the 
company went bankrupt, and "the boys and girls never told 
me." 
I 
I 
I 
I 
by 
In fact 1 Cast B---pla.gued by wretched memory caused_ J, 
advancing years---cannot understand that it has been more i1 
than a year since she last worked in her beloved watch 
company .. She will tell you she was there "last week." 
Ironically, time now escapes this old watchmaker. 
But she resolutely tells you: 
"There was nothing like the Waltham Watch1" 
i; 
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CASE C 
Case C was a kindly, grey haired old lady who guessed 
"that everyone in the plant knows me." "I started working 
in '98 from seven in the morning until six at night, for a 
dollar a day. I worked my first twenty one years as a 
nickel plater under Mr. Williams, who had charge of that 
work." 
She remembered how a Waltham employee, Olaf Olsen, 
"revolutionized the industry by putting the first ladies 
small wrist watch together. It differed in that it no 
longer required frequent oiling. This watch was also much 
finer because of its unique damaskeening or pattern which 
was all done by hand." 
The veteran employee then showed the interviewer her 
husband's fine old gold watch. She pried the cover off wi th
1
J 
I' 
a fingernail and exposed the back of the watch. "That pat- ' 
tern you are looking at is the damaskeening," she said. 
They commenced to get economical ••• 
"Just after World War I ended, they commenced to get 
economical. The movement stockroom took over our work and 
we got less work and money as a resu lt of this change. At 
that time the company had three main production divisions; 
the clock, speedometer, and watch sections. I went to the : 
,I 
speedometer division in 1920. Our first speed units worked l1 
on the front wheels. Later we switched to the type that I! 
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consisted of a compact magnet. 
"We made speedometers for most of the fine cars. 
We didn't have the Ford contract at first because the 'T' 
had no speedometer. When we started manufacturing for himJ, 
the workers thought we were getting poor to have to be 
working for Ford. 
"Originally there was only a 'speed meter' that a 
man from Waterloo, Iowa had perfected. The 'ometer' part 
was added by an Englishman named Mr. Toni. He was around 
Waltham a long time. While in the city he invented the 
tachometer." 
Mr. Fitch was good to us ••• 
11 It was during the presidency of Ezra Fitch that the 
Riverside Club was opened to the employees. It had former·· 
ly been a supervisors• home. We fixed it up with a fine 
dining room, bowling alleys, and a swimming pool. The club 
earned its own living. You see we gave lessons in cooking 
and sewing and the like, for which there was a small charge. 
Whenever there were any famous swimmers in this area we got 
them out to our pool. Once we even had some Australians. 
Imagine thatl Mr. Dumaine closed the club and tore down 
the building when he took over the company. 
"V.Jhile Mr. Fitch was president we had the greatest 
band in the country. They used to give a fine concert eve~ 
week. I'd say that two thirds of the employees purchased I 
II 
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company stock during his ownership. Mr. Fitch, he didn't 
want any union. However, when some group would win a 
grievance, be would give us all the same benefits they had 
won. 
I remember Frederic C. Dumaine ••• 
"He would make you believe he was an angel from 
heaven. However, I believe in actions, not words. When he 
came in be tried to get all of the stock back from the 
employees. Those who wouldn't sell we~e gyped when he 
changed the name of the company from the American Waltham 
Watch Company to its present title. He made seventeen 
million dollars; a regular gold mine it was for him." 
Pointing our her window, C said: "I used to coast 
down that hill as a child. The company owned that land and 
the old Adams House that is now the Waltham Inn. Fact is 
they owned a lot of fine properties in Waltham. Dumaine 
sold them all." 
Lands sake I certainly do remember the strike of 
1924 ••• 
"The strike started because of a ten per cent cut 
made in the pay of the finishers. Vfuen they were willing 
to accept Dumaine's adjusted offer of a seven per cent cut, 
the manufacturing section of the plant refused to go along 
with them. I was out twenty-two weeks myself. Our state 
representative allowed the strikers to use the armory for 
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their meetings. I He shouldn't have done that because I know 1 
I 
I that its against the law to bring strife into a federal or 1 
state build.ing. [I 
"one of the strike leaders, a man by the name of ---,11 
was rehired. The foremen in both the finishing and manufac-11 
turing divisions refused to take him back. Both of those I 
II 
II 
foremen were laid off within three months. --- remained. 
I think there was something funny about that strike from 
I 
I the start. I've always had, you know, a sort of under-
current of suspicion. I 
"Dumaine had his own way after the strike. In July I 
il 
of '26 he laid off the oldest men in each department. Un-
fortunately my husband was one of those who lost his job." 
I worked part-time at Filene's for years ••• 
"For eight years I was periodically laid off in Nov-
ember and didn't go back to work until about the first of 
March. That was when we were making speedometers for Ford 
and our layoff coincided with his yearly retooling. I 
worked during these months at Filene's, a Boston department 
store." 
We all voted for Roosevelt ••• 
"From 1927-32 the wages for ladies was only twenty 
cents an hour and just forty cents for skilled men. Yes, 
I realize that period was during the business boom, but we 
didn't get any of it. Our wages were very low. The NRA 
II 
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got us a six dollar raise. We used to joke about the 
elections after that. We had a rhyme about who are you 
going to vote for? Who, why the fellow who got us the six 
dollar raise." 
Sure I belonged to the union ••• 
"Mr. Cenerazzo fought. good and hard to bring up 
I 
I 
\i 
II 
wages. However, he did a great dis£avor to the watchmakers I 
by dropping out of the A.F. of L. and forming our own 
independent union. The A.F. of L. is a strong trade union 
and they carry a lot of political weight. 
"Mr. Cenerazzo sets the senority lists. The older 
employees are more conscientious than the younger ones who 
push for speed. Everybody knows that quality counts in this 
I business. This speed has to be controlled. Those who work 
too fast can be controlled because they wouldn't be in the 
£actory if they didn't really have to work. Some of these 
speedy workers were getting their work turned back by the 
inspectors and then getting paid for doing the same work 
again. I don't think that is right." 
Case C is at present active in the company Credit 
Union. She also stated that: II 
"I helped to establish the Relief Association in the 1
1 
plant. Our plan was a model for all industrial insurance. 
We paid fifty cents a month. When we were sick we could 
receive eight dollars a week up to a maximum of ten weeks • 
I 
,I 
I. 
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There was also a hundred dollar cash payment at death 
the policy benefits." 
among I 
. I 
I 
A nice place in which to work ••• I 
"our plant is probably one of the cleanest places to I 
work in the country. Our maintenance department was the I 
largest of the forty-two in the factory. The floors 1 sinks, , 
and toilets were always kept clean. When Mr. Fitch was wit~ ' 
us we had a doctor, optician, dentist, and five nurses right 
in the building." 
I was happiest under the Fitch's ••• 
"There was more doing then. We was all like one big 1 
family. We had departmental dances then which were wonder-
ful. Each division would try to out do the others with 
their decorations and arrangements. We also had the River-
side Club." 
In a discussion of one time company president Ira c. 
Guilden, C stated that 11he was a Swiss representative from 
here to there." ~ou know, of course, that he was Bulova•s 
brother-in-law and that he owned half of Florida. 
"He stopped the repair department from which there 
had always been a good source of money. He also changed -
from the jobber system of distributing the watches to that 
of a company sales force. My cousin in Vermont runs a gen-
eral store and handles some watches. When the change oc• 
curred from the jobber system he was no longer able to buy 
42 
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a few watches; he had a choice of buying a big bunch or 
getting none at all. He just stopped handling the Waltham 
line. 
"Whenever his customers had previously experienced 
,, 
J. 
lj 
I 
' 
I 
i 
I 
I 
difficulty with a Waltham watch they would sent it directly 
I 
to his Boston jobber for repair. He would like to know 1! 
what they are going to do now that the jobbers are out and \1 
the company is no longer handling repairs. He thinks this 11 
lj 
policy will be the ruin of the company. 
on II "He sells a lot of Bulova's because he makes more 
them. People want cheaper watches. The Swiss can sell 
cheaper because they don't pay good wages. They must bring 
up their standard of living. 
''Gu1lden manufactured so many watches that we had no f\ 
chance to sell them. It was as if he were trying to sell I 
ij us out. His policy was just opposite to that of Hamilton. 
They work on the scarcity principle and never have no inven-
11 
tory. 
"Mr. Johnson was a fine executive, but he wouldn't 
43 
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industry into a cocked hat. No, my cousin didn't buy any 
at that time because he had no knowledge of selling any of 
them. 
"some of the narrow~minded people in the place ob-
jected to the fact that Mr. Hagerty was a Holy Cross man 
'I 
jL__ 
!I 
i! 
II 
I 
and that all of' his executive help were Holy Cross men. 1; 
Me, I've got no religious prejudice at all, I'm just telli~1 
you what some of 'em thought. 
"The place became top heavy with official help. 
thought that Mr. Howard, in personnel under Mr. Hagerty, 
a member of the FBI." 
As to the causes of the company difficulties... ·! 
I 
"Put me down as agin' government control. The one 1! 
party system is not good. Power with control is corruptiono l 
Of course Guilden's big inventory was a factor. We were put 
1/ 
to the wall when he discontinued the jobber system of dis- I 
tributing our watches. 
~ou know I don't always believe that the president 
of the company is as much to blame as the general manager. 
Mr. Boucher, Dumaine's general manager, was aggressive and 
all right if you liked that type of administration. He 
built up and tore down various departments. There was 
constant movement going on without any consistency in his 
actions. 
"Another thing, he was afraid of capable, able men. 
I 
1\ 
I 
I 
I 
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He thought of them as a threat to his position. Thus 
young man showing any real ability didn't stay with us 
I'll give you my solution ••• 
tti guess the only solution lies in getting the 
Dumaine a' to take it back. They know how to run the place .• 
They are the logical choice for having run it so long. 
"Besides, there's nothing left for them to destroy 
now! 
"Spec ifically we will have to 
I 
go back to the jobbers ,I 
get rid of our inventory and put out new models. We also 
should push the custom parts division; their jobs pay like 
everything. I know that it will be slow progress, but the 
Dumaines' could pick things up quicker than anybody else." 
il 
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CASE D 
Case D "started working for The American Waltham 
Watch Company in 1888. I got in the plant on my mother's 
pull as she knew all the big shots. My dad was also then 
I 
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in charge of the company's houses. Unless you had pull you I 
couldn't get work in the factory at that time. Everybody 11 
wanted to work there." 
Apparently D., in his sixty odd years with the comp:tJ:Jy ,! 
was perfectly satisfied with his original job. D stated 
that "I got in and stayed in. I got a week's pay and have 
been satisfied." 
D's duties consisted of "setting 'em up and 
'em after that. I was never no machine operator. 
•em up." 
D was proud of the fact that he was able to put his 
daughter through college. 
I 
recalls that once his mother and a group of other women 
went to company president Royal Robbins to seek higher wagesJl 
Mr. Robbins told them "that they would get no more money 
because they were better dressed than his wife." D did not 
ever recall seeing how Mrs. Robbins dressed, nor did any of II 
the complaining wage seekers. 
Case D was very proud of "having attended horological1j 
{watch making) school at nights, even though what I studied I! 
has never directly applied to my work." 
!i 47 
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"A dumb crowd couldn't make watches," said D. "we 
,I 
II 
were always told that if we didn't like the work or wages 
in the watch factory to go somewhere else for . a while. Few I 
did, and those who did regretted it." I 
D summarized his more than a decade of working under 
Ezra c. Fitch as follows: "he wouldn't speak to an ordinary I 
man." 1: 
I 
"I liked the Dumaine ownership better than any other. l 
They gave me a better deal. Whoever raised the Dumaine boysl\ 
to the common schools in ConcordJ1 did a good job. Spike went I 
II 
I 
I 
He treated us all the same. Why both boys married common 
girls, that is, they didn't marry rich." 
D was "lucky" during the strike of 1924. "I was sick l\ 
just prior to the trouble and was receiving company sick 
relief at the time and throughout the strike. I didn't 
have to hire over like most of 'em, and you know,-! didn't 
lose a single friend like a lot of fellows did." 
The depression didn't bother D too much. He did not 
recall if there were, or were not, wage or hour cuts. "I 
took what they gave me and got by" was his summarization of 
the severest business recession that our country has thus 
far undergone. 
D was emphatic in his belief that "the watch plant 
was the finest place in which to work. It was always warm; 
you had all the heat you wanted and the work was light." 
II 
====================== T "Nice folks worked there too. Some were geniuses 
who worked days and studied nights. Then when they got 
their degree they left the factory to practice medicine, 
law or engineering." 
D construed the "boss" of the plant to be the fore-
men and supervisors. "Some were good and some not so good, 
but they have all gone before me. Most of the assistant 
foremen were nothing but errand boys for the job masters. 
I found the place I wanted and stayed there. 
"Some of the men who left the bench to become fore-
men and supervisors forgot they ever knew me. _pne such man 
made supervisor and then was fired. He used to meet me on 
the corner and I'd talk to him just the same. 
"It seemed to me that those who kicked most about 
li 
!i 
il 
II 
I 
their pay were the ones who later tried to cut us down when . 
they had a chance to regulate others' pay. If you gave 'em II 
a show it went to their head. Most of •em didn't amount to 
1
, 
anything." 
D, when asked for his opinion of the Guilden-Johnson 
era replied, "ask ten men about them and you'll get ten 
diff~rent yarns about them." D, however, did threaten to 
quit if Guilden had forced him to "set-:-up" Swiss machines. 
"They finally did move some into my room, but if they came 
to me seeking assistance with their troubles I said, NO!" 
"My supervisor knew what I could do. Once I sent to 
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the obsolete room and reclaimed some American machinery and 
we threw out the Swiss stuff. I told people lots of things 
without getting no credit. There are things the head man 
don't know and they don't know who does know. 
"Several girls worked under me. If I were no good 
they wouldn't have got the work out. If something wasn't 
going good most anywhere they would call me. There was 
II 
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lots of jealousy all around, mostly about the little fboss 1 ·I 
However, I had a knack for getting along with people---! II 
II 
understood physiology." · 1 
D, speaking of the company's last president, John 
Hagerty, said "there have been things going on as if they 
was going to investigate him. His half-price sale got the 
jewelers down on the company. Everyone is down on the 
company." When asked who everyone was and why they were 
"down" on the company, D "didn't know." 
The Swiss are to blame ••• 
"We can't compete with the lovely Swiss people and 
children. It's the best country in the world except the 
United States. Even the Swiss in the factory say that, 
although they still stay here. Even if we stopped the 
importation of Swiss watches today there are still enough 
on hand to sell for two years. 
"Elgin and Hamilton will go. I'm surprised how they 
have lasted. We can't keep sending money to Europe and 
jl 
I 
I 
I 
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letting cheap stu:ff in free of duty. This country has 
never been any good unless we have had a war or a tariff. 
"The Southern Democrat has always wanted :free trade. 11 
The Northern Democrat gets all the post offices and the 
Southern Democrat gets free trade. No groups so hate each 
other as these two. They are ruining the country. Cheap 
politics is the rule today." 
D feels the solution lies ••• 
jl 
I 
·I 
I 
"In starting again and starting new. There should j 
be changes for there are some men L"l places where they don• J I 
belong. There won't be no trouble getting a labor force ' 
because most places won't hire us when they know we're from 1 
the watch factory. It's such a nice place to work they are I 
afraid we'd quit them when it reopens. I also think we 
should make more than watches. Those timing devices for 
guided missiles would be an answer." 
Frequently interspersed throughout the interview 
were numerious references tp "I 1ve been lucky" and "don't 
put that down." Thus about half of the talk with "lucky" 
D has "not been put down." 
As the interview ended and the interviewer was going \ 
out the front door, D was still muttering about his "luck 11 
from the day my mother's pull got me in up until last !, 
I' II 
month." "I was lucky my eyes lasted, lucky I found the ij 
right company and the right job. Yes, I've been lucky. • I 
F=====~=======================================================~~.======== 
CASE E 
On an August morning in 1906, a 16-year-old school 
I girl applied for a job at the American Waltham Watch Compacy1 
"just for fun." 1 She was pessimistic about her chances for 
employment, perhaps because she had lived her 
in the Waltham community and was keenly aware 
younger years II 
I 
of the social 
11 
advancement and prestige derived from association with the 
watch company. 
"I really didn't think they would hire me," the same 
woman recalls today. "But they hired me right away. All 
II 
II 
I had to do was go home and get a school certificate and rrry 11 
parents' consent. I think I ran all the way." 
A short time later, with parental blessings and the 
required certificate, the girl who will be known here as 
I 
Case E returned to the Waltham gates and began a watchwork- 1 
ing career which did not end until the firm's bankruptcy in I 
February, 1950. Now she spends idle days at home as Federal,! 
II 
I 
II 
II 
courts weigh the fate of Waltham Watch, and she contends 
she'll be among the first employees recalled should good 
fortune conclude the legal proceedings. 
However, her hopes for the future in no way impair 
1
1 
her memories of the past. She remembers her first job well.!\ 
"I went in to learn assembling watchmaking, which is 
putting in the stem, all the wheels and the mainspring. We 
girls, you can see, did most of the assembling work. That 
~ =- --= =--========-=================~~~- -~~~-""""'=--~ 
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work took about a year and a half to learn, which is what II 
I. they figure for a good assembler." ,I 
·
1
1
11 
She was employed at assembling until the First World :\ 
War. Pressed with large government war orders, the Waltham II 
Company was unable to recruit sufficient labor in its !I 
immediate vicinity and, as a result, opened a. chain of 
branch offices in five other cities. This expansion program!' 
II 
was important to Case E. 
I 
"I happened to be one of the girls sent up to the ' 
Gardner (Mass.) branch to teach assembling and to inspect," 1
1 
the respondent said. "We just assembled the watches up 
there, then they came back to Waltham for finishing and to 
be timed and cased. I was at Gardner for a year and a half.' 1 
She returned to the main Waltham plant as an inspec·-
tor in 1920. Her return approximated the fall of the 
management of Ezra Fitch and the chain of succeeding events 
which saw the arrival of President Frederic C. Dumaine in 
1923. According to Case E, the slcyrocketing debt and the 
alleged mismanagement of the Fitch period were unnoticed by 
herself. 
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Case E remembered Conover Fitch, too. She rested 
her elbows on the table and, eyes fastened on the inter-
viewer's hurrying pencil, related an incident concerning 
young Fitch. 
"He used to come up and visit Gardner when I was 
there. I can remember this one thing very well. One day 
when he was up there, a terrible thunder and lightning 
storm came up and struck nearby. The workers became rather 
uneasy, and he told them they could all go home if they 
wanted to. He was a very nice fellow." 
She believes that Ezra Fitch's downfall was the 
result of internal strife within management itself. Case E 
claims that two factions were fighting for control of the 
plant, with one faction "trying to oust old man Fitch out 
of there." She confessed the employees had no knowledge 
of the mounting indebtedness, and she tried to substantiate 
her contention that one faction did not have the firm's 
best interests at heart. 
"They had one fellow who was put in to watch the 
company by the stockholders. His only experience was run-
ning a second-rate hotel. He used to come around with 
white chamois gloves on inspecting. He didn't know any-
thing." 
After returning to the Waltham main plant in 1920 as I 
an inspector, Case E was assigned to instructing "in 1921 I 
- _,_,·=--=-==·-==rr--==--=·: === =================_):-= ----------- -
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1\ 
or 1922." She instructed for approxima tely eight years 
until the Great Depression arrived and teaching was aban-
doned due to the fact that no new workers were being hired 
into the company. 
The respondent said she enjoyed better luck than 
I 
I' I 
I ~ 
II 
I 
,! 
most employees during the depression years. With instruct- i! 
ing abolished, she was returned to assembling of what she 
This work involved a watch call-ed "first quality work. n 
known as "The Vanguard." She also assemb led the first set 
of watches carrying sweep second hands, made especially 
for doctors and nurses. 
11 ! was able to work part-time during the depression 
on the sweep second hand watches," Case E pointed out. She 
wanted to express how fortunate she considered herself. 
~ou can put it this way---! didn't collect any unemploy-
ment pay." 
The inter viewer managed to arrest her fast advance-
ment through hi~tory to ask her recollections of the ascend-
ancy of Frederic c. Dumaine in 1923 and the strike which 
followed in 1924. 
"I remember that after Mr. Dumaine came, people in 
some of the other rooms wanted a ten per cent raise. They 
wanted everybody else in the plant to be in s ympathy with 
them. That started a strike for which everyone was sorry 
afterwards. It was the finishe r s who really started it." 
li 
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Case E said she was instri..tcting at the time of the 
strike and by nature o:f her work did not "lose much time." 
I 
I 
lj 
At that point her brother--also an employee of the !I 
Waltham Watch Company--sauntered into the room, sat down \I 
I in a chair nearby, lit his pipe and listened to the conver- 1 
I 
sation. I 
"My brother and I always found the Dumaines all I 
right,n Case E said. She looked at her brother, and he j1 
shook his head approvingly. "They were all right by us. jl 
In fact, they weren't there very long before I got a raise . \1 
I 
My raise wasn't effected by the strike either." ;I 
How did the employees feel about Dumaine and the \I 
company after their strike ended in failure? 11 
"I can't say very much about the strike myself," II 
Case E commented. "I do know that people were glad to get II 
back to work--from what I saw of them. Things went right 
along the same after they did get back." I 
I 
Dumaine's generosity with bonuses impressed her very il 
much. She recalled that shortly after the strike a Christ- \I 
mas bonus was awarded to each employee. "I got about 
II 
This was followed I eighty-seven dollars," Case E guessed. i 
by vacation bonuses handed out the following July amounting I 
to approximately $50. 
present of $75. 
The next Christmas brought another 
"Then when the Dumaines went out, we got a nice 
I 
I 
i 
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I 
!..:- ----
·-----
J 
" 
II I 
II 
il 
!J 
I• 
il 
II 
01 
bonus, too. I think I got around a hundred and fifteen 
dollars. It was all very nice.n 
Case E recalled that during the Dumaine management 
at Waltham "a system of different groups called 1units 1 " 
was attempted. Each "unit•• was "supposed" to produce a set 
amount of work each day---"a certain percentage of pro-
ductionu---and, if they did not meet the goals, their pays 
were accordingly effected. Case E had her opinions of the 
system: 
"Some in those groups bene fl ted because they were 
slow worker.s and the fast workers carried them along. That 
didn't last long because it just didn't pan out right. 
Amongst those involved, there was lots of criticism. Of 
course, I didn't work that way myself, but I do remember 
it." 
Case E was not without general opinions regarding 
the management of Frederic C. Dumaine: 
"We were all right with the Dumaines, and we never 
lost much time while they were there. Some people think 
that they (the employees) were driven to death. Well, my 
idea has always been 'do a fair day's work for a fair day's 
pay.' Some people like to get their money for nothing; 
those are the ones who found fault with him. I don't think 
he was such an awful slave driver." 
The respondent, who worked at both instructing and 
il 
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I 
assembling during the management of Dumaine~ said she was 
aware of no decline in the quality of the Waltham watch. 
"I would say that the watch was just as good as ever 
I can't understand why it was said that the watch was any 
worse. Because Mr. Dumaine changed some policies, people 
seem to think that the watch had changed. They always put 
out a good watch during Mr. Dumaine's time. 'The Vanguard' 
watch was always called his pet watch. Those put out 
during the war (World War II) were good watches, too." 
Case E pointed out that her job also allowed her to 
make rejects, and watches which she rejected normally had 
their malfunctions corrected on the spot. However, there 
was no period in her stay at Waltham that she noticed any 
significant increase in the number of rejects. 
In addition to working on the pet "Vanguard" model 
and those bearing sweep second hands, the respondent also 
was employed during the 1930's on automobile clocks and 
twin-faced clocks. The latter type was a clock bearing 
two faces for purposes of being placed between twin beds. 
Case E 1 s job changed when Waltham went to war in 
1941. 
"I was working on government watches doing what was 
called •train jobbing and oiling.' I worked on the shock-
proofs and waterproofs~ which were very accurate watches. 
I know I bought two of them for my cousins in the Service 
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and they kept excellent time. There was a little difference 
between the shockproof watches and those we made before the 
war. The mainspring was different since it went through 
another process." 
The interviewer was prompted to ask about machine 
conversion necessary to manufacture military watches, 
important in that it meant expensive postwar reconversion 
to Waltham. 
"of course the tools and machinery had to be changed, l 
II 
and after the war some of the help had to be sent out for II 
awhile to get the tools converted again. Meanwhile, the 
Swiss went right on with their regular trade while we were 
in war work." 
Her brother, who had been quietly listening to the 
interview, had finished his pipe. He got to his feet and 
excused himself. Case E watched him disappear into the 
hallway. 
The union? 
"oh yes, the union came into Waltham in 1941. I 
have high seniority because I've been there so long. The 
union has been all right as far as I can say, but I was all 
right before the union, too." 
The woman said she felt that the union brought more 
freedom into the company from the employees' standpoint, and ' 
as evidence she cited the facts that "girls" now are per-
mitted to smoke in the ladies' rooms, there are 10-minute 
58 
recreat ion periods, and vacations and holidays are taken 
with pay. 
"I don't think there was any company resistance to 
our union. But I don't think our union is like some of 
' q 
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those you read about in the papers---always fighting! Ours I 
I 
is more of a company union." 
Frederic C. Dumaine departed from the Waltham Watch 
Company in 1944, and Ira C. Guilden became his successor. 
Case E had this to say about Mr. Guilden: 
"I think he's the one who made a mess of it. 
promised everything to us." 
She paused for a moment to reflect. 
"I was just trying to think what Mr. Cenerazzo 
He 
(Walter P.) told him---something about selling us down the 
river. He wanted to sell Waltham to a Swiss company, I 
think. As Mr. Cenerazzo told us, it was only through him 
(Mr. Cenerazzo) that we were saved." 
Guilden resigned in June, 1948, and Paul P. Johnson 
became president of Waltham Watch. And Case E continued 
at her task of "train jobbing and oiling. But she said of 
Mr. Johnson: 
"I just saw that man once. Everybody in the plant 
seemed to like him. But he left all of a sudden. That 
was during the three months we were out from January to 
April (1949). I honestly think Johnson tried to help the 
I 
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I 
company, but he and Cenerazzo didn't agree on something and 
1
. 
he got through---from what I hear. 
11 I 1ve heard some of the men say that if they'd I 
allowed Mr. Johnson to go ahead with his plans, we wouldn't !: 
have wound up where we did. But that's just hearsay." 
Case E was recalled to her job on April 18, 1949, 
following the first bankruptcy closure. John Hagerty had 
1\ 
II 
I 
succeeded Paul P. Johnson to the presidency of the company. / 
The subjec~ wished to show the interviewer the letter1/ 
sent by Mr. Hagerty summoning her back to work. She search-
ed through her desk, and finally confessed that she'd mis-
laid it. However, she said the gist of the letter com-
plimented her on her long service with the company and 
expressed Hagerty's hopes "that all would pan out." 
"I never saw Mr. Hagerty but once. He came in one 
day to give a watch to a man who had worked there for a 
great number of years and was having a birthday. But the 
majority of the help didn't think that he knew enough about 
managing. Even the older men said that. Things seemed to 
have that 'don't care' attitude about them." 
The suddenness with which the Waltham Company closed J 
in February, 1950, seemed to amaze Case E. She indicated 1j 
that the future seemed optimistic until the dismissal 
were given. 
orders I 
I 
"We had nice orders coming in, and we were quit~ I' 
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busy. There was plenty of work. 
"My boss had said to me just the day before (on 
February 2) that I'd be busy until summer or August. Then 
suddenly we got a few hours notice that we were to get 
through in the afternoon. But they let us work the next 
day until four o'clock and that was all---up until now. 
We're still home, waiting and hoping." 
Case E isn't certain about what happened to the 
Waltham Watch Company. Asked directly for her opinions, 
could only say: "I don't know what to say in that case. 
don't know who is to blame. All I know is that we seemed 
to be having the orders when we went out." 
But her later comment was more informative: 
"I told a foreman not so long ago that sometimes I 
think it was the help's fault. They had that 'don't care' 
attitude. They didn't make a good watch when they had that 
attitude, and they hurt themselves. The majority wasn't 
like that--- just a few. This attitude seemed more prevalent
1 
among the younger workers but, of course, they feel that if 11 
they don't like it they can get out. The older ones are I 
more interested." 
Now Case E watches the court proceedings and hopes 
that she'll soon be back at her task of "train jobbing." 
These duties require minor repairs and oiling of movements 
after the watches are "cased up." Since this is one of the II 
II 
il 
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final processes, she believes she will be one of the first 
workers recalled should the company resume operations. She 
estimates there are 250,000 movements in the present Waltham 
inventory needing only this final processing prior to 
marketing. 
She liked her work very much. 
"I always felt that Waltham (the company) was just 
like home to me. The discipline was always lovely, there 
were good lights, and in fact, I worked in an air condi-
tioned room. I always had a good foreman too, and anybody 
who worked there always worked with a nice class of people." 
Case E shook her grey head. 
"I'm looking forward to getting back now. 
forty-three years seems like a long while." 
As I said ,! 
Then she smiled. 
"But it doesn't seem long to me." 
II 
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CASE F 
When Case F went to work for the Waltham Watch 
Company in 1902, the plant was, as he expresses it, "full 
of the sons of fathers." The skills and abilities at 
precision watch making tended to pass down through genera-
tions, and Waltham's early prominence in the trade might 
well have been secured in this familiar dedication to the 
craft. 
"But things changed," Case F unhappily concludes 
today. "Boys started going to high school and college, and 
when they came out of college they weren't content with any-
thing but white collar jobs. I think the calibre of worker ., 
at the factory changed over the years." I 
The subject wanted to emphasize his point. 
"Whole families worked there when I was a kid. But 
this tended to change along about the end of the Fitch 
period. It had nothing to do with the management---just a 
trend of the times. Remember that a law came in forcing 
boys to go to school to the age of sixteen. 
seemed to move right into college." 
Case F looks young for his 68 years. 
After that 
He was born 
at Waltham on October 2, 1881, and was raised in the commu-
nity which spread around the watch company. He began his 
42 years of service with Waltham Watch in 1902, a tenure 
which ended with his retirement in 1946 after he had 
I-
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advanced "through the ranks" to chief inspector of the 
watch division. 
The respondent worked in a wholesale and dry goods 
"house" in Boston for four years prior to becoming employed 
with Waltham in 1902. After working in the plant for 19 
years, he left his job in 1921 and went to Manchester, New 
Hampshire, because he "wanted to go into business for 
myself." His venture in private business met with dismal 
failure when a strike played havoc with the local economy 
and most of the populace was "put on the bum up there." 
"I came back here in 1922 and went to work in the 
rep;~. ir department of the watch company. I was. only in the 
repair department for about a year, then transferred to job 
master on the 'finishing job.' Finishing is the final 
process on the watch. You see that it is fit properly." 
Case F "can't remember just who was president" when 
he returned to the Waltham plant after his business venture 
at Manchester, but dates reveal that his reemployment 
approximately coincided with the incoming of the management 
of Frederic c. Dumaine. 
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"I do know that I started to go ahead when Mr. D~l 
II 
was there," the subject said. 
He was reemployed as job master on "finishing" for 
II 
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about one year, then was advanced to foreman in the "small 
watch finishing department." The small watches involved 
I 
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were "from a dime-size up to the size of a twenty-five cent I 
piece." Case F was foreman in the prementioned department 
for 12 years prior to being advanced to chief inspector of 
the watch division with the title of superintendent---the 
position he held at the time of his retirement. 
Case F began his primary 18 months training course 
in 1902 during the presidency of Ezra Fitch. The close as-
sociations of Mr. Fitch with the workers in his plant was 
reiterated by the respondent: 
"Ezra Fitch knew everybody who worked in the factory. 
I had no personal contacts with him aside from the committee ! 
I 
I worke.d on, but he knew who I was. Under Mr. Fitch the 
company was second to none, but we hadn't gotten into the 
small watch production then." 
Case F concealed no sentiments about the contribu-
tiona made to Waltham Watch by Ezra Fitch's son, Conover. 
"Then Mr. Fitch turned everything over to his boy 
Conover. He was a flat tire if I ever saw one. When Mr. 
Dumaine finally took it over, I understand it was nine 
million dollars in debt." 
The subject remembered that he "had heard it said" 
that Waltham Watch was borrowing money to pay high dividends! 
on its stock during the late days of the Fitch period. I 
"And the place was actually bankrupt at the time, 
Case F said. 
\\ 
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If we are to judge by the information of the respond- 11 
ent, employee morale must have sagged as mismanagement 11 
became apparent on every side, And according to him there :1· 
seemed to be no reason to look to Conover Fitch for encour- I 
agement. 
I 
"I can remember going down to see Conover Fitch once I 
when I was on a committee. Why, I can remember it now. He ' 
had his feet on the desk, was in his shirt sleeves, and had il 
a bottle of beer beside him. When we came out, we all said: 1 
II 
'This place will go to hell in a hurryJ'" 
However, the Fitch era at Waltham did enjoy its 
glorious hours. Case F's recollections went back beyond 
the final hours of financial despair---which saw .the Fitch 
management topple---to compliment the earlier atmosphere of 
happiness which existed within the company. 
"I guess for the employees the finest time in its 
II 
II 
II 
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I: 
life was back during the Fitch regime. That's why Waltham li 
was once called 'the playhouse of America.• But, of course,l 
times were different then---no unions and such. Now the 
young fellows are going out, and they don't want to work 
at all." 
Frederic C. Dumaine became president of the Waltham 
Watch Company in 1921, and the subject, who was returning 
from his business failure at Manchester, believes that the 
change in management opened the doors of advancement to him•ll 
I 
I 
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As he puts it, he "started to go ahead." 
"He {Dumaine) watched the dollars and cents, and he 
knew where the money was going. There was no extravagance. 
He wanted to know how much was taken in and how much was 
spent each day---and he had to get that report every day. 
Mr. Dumaine was an all-round business man. He'd had a 
finger in railroads, mills, and several o~her things. 
"He did a lot to cut down overhead. He cut down the 
sales force, too. There were fellows who had been living 
on the company in carpeted offices. There was a lot of 
extravagance during the last part of the Fitch regime, and 
he did away with that." 
Case F was the recipient of several extremely gener-
ous acts by President Dumaine, for whom he yet has a fond-
ness which ran undisguised in his conversation. 
"An interesting thing I do like to tell about Mr. 
Dumaine is that when I was sick back in 1938, he sent my 
wife and me to South America on an eighteen day cruise on 
one of his ships. I also had a couple of other trips under 
Mr. Dumaine---one to Florida and one to Bermuda." 
Such vacations for employees was not an established 
policy of the management. 
The Waltham Watch strike of 1924 was a 
ence to the subject in that the walkout began 
vivid ex peri- I 
in his sectionl 
of the plant. His own words best describe the apparent I 
lj 
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spontaneous nature of the strike: 
"The place wasn't organized then. It was all a 
matter of dollars and cents---wages. I can remember that 
it started in my department. It was a funny thing. It 
came about very quick. One department went out, then 
another and another. Finally, everyone went out except a 
couple of hundred." 
The strike achieved no ends for the workers, and 
I 
I! 
I Case 
F illustrated this conclusion in saying: "we didn't get 
anything out of it. Only a good long loafl" As for 
morale after the strike had been employee stifled, he said: 
"It took a long time to overcome feelings about the compan:vJI 
I but 
with 
that worked out gradually." And he dropped the topic 
that. 
What of the evolving quality of the Waltham watch? 
The advent of the small-style watch in answer to 
consumer taste was stressed by Case F, who felt that the 
company's production of smaller watches brought it into 
competition with the Swiss. Prior to this, Waltham "did a 
good business." 
"That's something that has come about in the last 
fifteen to eighteen years," he said. "And still they don't 
do anything about the tariffl I think we've had a little 
more trouble since the little watches have come in, but all 
the companies have had the same luck and we were on a par 
1: 
I 
I 
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with most of them. Funny thing is that people never talk 
about the good ones---but you hear about the dudsl" 
Case F frankly admitted that the Waltham Company 
short of his conception of perfection in mechanization 
(which was an effort of the Dumaine management) for~ to use 
his words, "there were a few things which could have been 
improved upon in the line of machinery." However, he did 
not feel that these mechanical shortcomings had anything to 1 
do with production or the ultimate quality of the Waltham 
watch. 
He felt that President Dumaine's efforts with time 
studies met with some degree of success: 
"They did some good. Time studies work both ways, 
you know---sometimes in favor of the company~ sometimes for 
the employees. This one seemed to be about fifty-fifty." 
The Dumaine management carried Waltham Watch through 
the major part of the war (World War II) years. The re-
spondent presented some interesting opinions regarding the 
problems of reconversion at the war's conclusion---problems 
which faced successors Ira c. Guilden and Paul Johnson. 
"We really didn't deviate much during the war from 
our regular production. We supplied watches to the Army 
and Navy, but they were just what we had been making all 
along." 
Case F•s employment with the watch company extended 
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into the management of Ira C. Guilden, but he did not 
transgress into the new era without a final opinion about 
the Dumaine epoch. 
"It's a funny thing, but everyone is yelling for 
Dumaine to come back now. But when he was here they were 
dissatisfied. You can mank one sure thing; they did work 
steady when he was there." 
What did he mean by "dissatisfied?" 
"Oh, I don't know. Did you ever see a bunch in a 
factory which was happy about management? A man like 
Dumaine, who comes in to straighten out any industry, has 
to upset some apple carts. For instance, that strike (of 
1924) had to be. It was said that some departments which 
had inventories for over a year were still working over-
time. He had to cut stuff like that out, and people got 
I 
I 
I 
li 
upset." /I 
Case F preferred to use the words ":flat tire" to J!, 
express his opinions of executives whose abilities he 11 
doubted. With a courteous acknowledgement of the conversa- I 
tional traits of Ira c. Guilden, the respondent gave candid 1 
comments regarding the last Waltham president under whom 
he worked. 
"Guilden? Ob, he was a very pleasant fellow to talk I 
with. He was going to do wonders for us. He told us he j 
I
I 
could sell all the watches we made: 'You make 'em and I'll II 
jl 
Jl 
II 
II 
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sell 'emJ' What a flat tire he wasJ He ran through about \1 
three million dollars in three years. 
"one thing that he done that was a flat tire. He 
took the sale of watches away from the jobbers. He tried 
to do with sixteen or seventeen salesmen what about three 
hundred and ten jobbers had done before. Bulova had done 
it and got away with it, and I suppose he thought he could 
do it. He was related to Bulova, you know." 
Case F retired from the watch company on March 15, 
1946. He did not suffer in the drastic collapse of the 
firm under President John Hagerty in 1949 1 but from the 
solitude of retirement he kept abreast of employee senti-
ments regarding the snowballing effects of indebtedness and 
eventual bankruptcy. 
He is keenly aware of the damage done Waltham's 
reputation by President Hagerty's decision to clear excess 
inventories through half-price sales in certain selected 
department stores. 
II 
II 
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"That move wasn't so good," the respondent contended. j 
"It would have been all right if they'd given all the I 
jewelers a break. Now, that's poor management right there. I 
See what I mean? Dumaine would never had done that. 
HagertyJ A politician trying to be a business manJ" 
Case F centered the blame for Waltham's failure on 
mismanagement. He did not hesitate in making his charge 
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against executive failures. 
"Inefficient management would be my say right off 
bat. You can't take a politician and put him in a plant 
and make it a success. This fellow Guilden---I don't know 
what to say about him. But it was mistakes and errors 
right down the lineJ" 
With that he rose from his chair~ entered the ~ouse, 
and returned in a few moments bearing a framed scroll. The 
scroll contained the names and years of service of the 
executives in attendance at the farewell banquet given 
Frederic c. Dumaine on his departure from Waltham. It 
credited Case F with 41 years of loyal service to the 
company. 
11Yes, 11 he concluded when the interviewer had compli-
mented his souvenir, "I am proud of thatJ" 
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CASE G 
Case G was an active woman of "about fifty" who 
I 
I 
I 
had been in and out of the watch factory a half-dozen 
times. She was proud of the fact that "I never got through I 
on my own, I always got laid off." 
She started working for the company in 1916 in the 
finishing department. "They taught me how to 'set 'em up' 
under an instructor named Miss ----. ~iss ---- was Case 
B in this studiJ. After a while I was moved over to the 
lathes where I was put to work drilling holes in pallet 
bridges." 
I was not involved in the strike ••• 
"I was laid off just prior to the time of the strike. j 
I was working as a final inspector at the time and making I 
twenty dollars a week. My job was called one of the best 
paid ones in the factory. I don't know if that was true or 
not. 
"I got a job as a practical nurse and was caring for 
an elderly lady when they called me back to the factory. I 
However, I stayed with the old lady until she died and left I 
me on the outside. 
"It was in 1930 that I returned to the plant as a 
worker in the plate department. I did hand burring on 
pillar plates, balance cocks, and on the barrel, train, and 
pallet bridges. I used a tool similar to a household 
II 
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paring knife and sat all day long paring off the burrs. ~ I 
still use the same method of removing burrs today. 
"They paid us on a piece rate bases; maybe it was a 
penny for removing fifty burrs. Times were tough then and 
my average pay was only three and a half dollars a week. 
They told me that my supervisors were only getting eight 
dollars and a half. 
t! 
I' I 
"After a while I was transferred to another low pay-
ing job. They had me 'stoning pallet bridges•. That is, I [ 
would put the small pieces under a finger and then rub them ll 
on a stone. In that way we smoothed them down." 
I Case G recalled that she was laid off again in 1931 1 il 
after working only a year and a half. However, she was 11 
I finally called back to work in the speedometer division 
"in '32 or '33." 
"I worked an electric screw driver on_ the assembly 
line system. We were making speedometers for Ford then. 
My work, in fact the whole work process, was most interest-
ing. 
"It seemed to me, though, that every time you turned 
around in there some one would yell there would be no more 
work until Monday or for two weeks or longer. They had to 
lay us off because of a material shortage somewhere down 
the line. We also closed down when Ford was retooling." 
I was unfortunate ••• 
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"They laid me off again. Whenever anything happened 
I was the one to be let go. I was unfortunate. We had no 
union security or protection. If you were a favorite of 
your foreman you stayed. That's what counted--favoritisml 
"I went back to practical nursing again for two 
years. It got to be such that when they called you back 
you would return only if you had nothing better at the 
moment. I finally did return in '37 to work in the train-
making department. 
"They put me on a machine that required the use of 
both hands and feet. It had to do with cutting blanks. 
II 
I 
I got thirty cents an hour for the first two weeks and then l1 
went on to piece work. I guess I was too powerful with my 
hands, because I consistently cut the blanks too deep. 
"As a result of cutting too deep, I was transferred 
to a smaller lathe. There they had me burring crown wheels~ 
I worked faithfully at the work and loved it after a while. I 
I also was making a good wage." II 
In the dead of winter ••• 
"I'll never forget the night of January 17' 1938. 
It was :i.ri the dead of winter that they laid me off again. 
I, to this day, don't know why they did. So I went back 
to nursing. 
"They called me back to the factory in 1939. How-
ever, I had a good private case and didn't want to give it 
II 
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up. I went to the factory and talked with them. They 
advised me that under the circumstances I should stay where 
I was. 
"My patient died in 1940. I asked a friend of mine 
in the plant if there were any openings in her department. 
She spoke to her foreman who interviewed and then hired me 
with the consent of the factory Personnel Office. I was 
made an inspector of speedometer parts under Mrs. ----. 
~rs. ---- is Case C in this study]. 
"I .made up my mind that this was one job I was going 
to learn thoroughly. I did and loved the work. The fact 
is, I was often sent out to inspect other sections that 
were sending in bad parts to my department. 
" Mrs. ---- husband died during the war. Since I 
knew her work I applied for her position when she was out. 
My foreman accepted my offer and announced to the other 
girls that I was to be the assistant supervisor. When Mrs. 
---- returned they gave her a new job as supervisor, in a 
department in which she would have less time to think about 
her husband. 
"When the war ended there was a big lay off, but for i 
once I stayed. I was still inspecting speedometers in what I 
they called the t auto-auto t section. They made nk1eeempove to Iii 
final inspection of speedometers if I wanted to 
working. [ 
It 
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"We heard all kinds of rumors that the speedometer 
section was going to fold up. I was offered a job in the 
plate department. When I checked with my 'speed' foreman 
he suggested that I make the change. So I went to the 
plate department. 
"I took a five cents an hour cut when I went to my 
new department. However, they promised me that I might get 
more money later on. I still retained my rating as a supe~ 1 
visor. But you know, a supervisor is like a policeman, 
they have a nice name but get little money. 
ni got my final lay off in November of 1949 when the 
work petered out. The rest of the factory got through 
three months later in February." 
I liked the place ••• 
"All my foremen have always been very nice to me. 
There is a darn good group of people that you work with in 
that factory. In plain English, they were all pretty nice, 
a clean and respectable group. Why when anything would 
happen they would be right there to help you. I mean like 
collections for sickness or weddings or burials." 
Case G was high in her praise of the physical prop-
erties of the plant. 
11The place was very clean; they always kept it up 
to par. They were always papering, cleaning, and doing the 
1 
floors. Folks that go elsewhere to work will be lucky if I 
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they always have as good a place in which to work." 
Then Gadded a little bit wistfully ••• 
"There e.re some who are out like me who would go 
back even if the floors were d1rty." 
My candid opinion of Mr. Dumaine is ••• 
I~ 
I 
"We weren't too bad off under him. At least we were \ 
never worse off under him than under anyone else who has 
taken over. I really can't compare him with the others, 
since I'm positively no business woman." 
I do not remember ever · seeing Mr. Guilden ••• 
11He was supposed to build this and the other thing. 
He never did. Whose fault it was I don't know. I'm just 
an employee." 
Hagerty looked out for himself ••• 
"I couldn't pass any opinion on Mr. Hagerty. I do 
think his half-price sale was a good thing. It relieved us 1 
I did hear, though, that the II' 
But then, everybody has to 
of our stored-up inventory. 
jewelers were in a turmoil. 
look out for himself. 
. i 
I think that is why Mr. Hagerty held 
I 
the sale." 
Mr. Cenerazzo is not afraid of anybody ••• 
"I sort of doubted that he would last. You see we 
had never had a real union before. I was surprised when 
I 
the union came to life at the vote. Mr. Cenerazzo deserves 11 
II 
a lot of credit. He fights for all of us and isn't afraid 
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li of anybody. 
Jl "He is the one who got us all our benefits. Without 
him we wouldn't have the Blue Cross, siek benefit insurance,~~ 
vacations with pay, and the six paid holidays. He's all 
right." 
Why did she think the company closed~ 
"I'd love to know. I don't have the remotest idea 
as to who is, or who is not, to blame. The RFC deal seemed 
like a political deal, but I couldn't prove it. 
"I'd guess that the company didn't reconvert fast 
enough. Then the Swiss tariff is important, too. We ought 
to fix it so that it would be,nefit our people. The Swiss 
have had it good long enough. They used to say that we 
made the best watch in the world; we can do it again. 
The closing was a sad day ••• 
"It was a sad day when we came out. I I was fortunate I 
that I had unemployment insurance. Other firms don't have 
any use for you unless you are under thirty-five. Don't 
we older folks have to eat after we pass that age? This 
lay off is taking all we've saved,--our bonds and bank 
accounts. After they are gone, what are we going to do?" 
Who wants to go on welfare? ••• 
I 
I 
"I don't want to go on the welfare. Not when I have ! 
II 
good hands and good eyes. I've got a sick old mother to 
provide for by myself. Sure I've cried, but after a while 
I 
I 
I I 
I 
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you get all cried out. 
"I never made top money like some of the girls who 
earned over two dollars an hour purling. I always figured 11 
that when a crash came if you had never made it you would !1 
never miss it. Anyway I guess I liked my work too much and 
money not strong enough. 
I'm too young to die ••• 
"Since we don't know as much about Bulova or the 
others as we do about Dumaine, I don't think we would get 
the security under them as we did under the elder Dumaine. 
"I'm living in hopes that the factory will reopen. 
If you saw me in the protest parade a couple of weeks ago, 
you must have read the sign on my parasol." 
Case G's sign read: 
"I'm too young to die!" 
I 
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CASE H 
"I bad a reputation for putting anything in shape. 
They used to laugh at me because I was an 'old lady' about 
my work, but I used to do things which they said couldn't 
be done--like reducing a pivot two degrees." 
The elderly man, who confessed "I think I am eighty-
six years old," laid bare with words the integrity and on-
the-job skill which his presence had contributed to the 
Waltham Watch Company for approximately 61 years. 
He will be known here as Case H. Steady of hand (in 
spite of his long years at nerve wracking precision work) 
and clear in memory, Case H sat forward on the edge of his 
rocking chair and willingly volunteered his opinions of the 
company around which his livlihood had centered. 
Except for a three-year span during which he left 
Waltham to go "farming down in the country," Case H had 
been in continuous employment with the watch company. He 
went to work at Waltham on January 28, 1884, and saw his 
career come to an end with the firm's bankruptcy in Decem-
ber, 1948. 
Case H gave the impression that he actually was not 
' 
dismissed or forcibly retired from his job. The reorganiza-/1 
tion plans brought into the Waltham plant by President John 
Hagerty in 1949 did away with his highly-specialized job, 
and he "d-idn't go back." Yet he figures he was indirectly 
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"chased out." 
"I never learned watchmaking," Case H said. By 
which he meant he was only skilled at certain individual 
- operations of the total process. "That's what caused me 
· to be chased out of there. The last man there (Hagerty) 
said he had a job for me when the factory reopened. But 
he'd tied three jobs together--taking balance staffs out 
of balances (which I had done), and balance-throwing and 
spring-throwing (which I hadn't done). That's why I didn't 
go back--because I couldn't do the three jobs." 
Case H was born at Bath, Maine, on October 21, 1863. 
He is not certain of the year of his birth, but "it's 
He first went to i written somewhere in the family Bible." 
work for a publisher named E.C. Allen at Bath, but after 
I! 
a shor t tenure "got out of a job" and proceeded to Waltham. I 
The respondent's first job with Waltham Watch was 
that of "grinding." This task entailed placing pinions on 
a block, grinding both sides, then polishing one side to 
measurement. He worked at this for three years. 
"I went to the boss one day and asked him if he 
would change me to something else. I was making about two 
[I 
dollars and a half a day and would have made all the money _ 1 
I wanted. But I wanted to change because the work was so 
fine that I had to wear a double glass. And my eyesight 
wasn't too good." 
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Case H was changed to inspecting, but, when the 
company learned he was planning to leave the watch trade 
for private farming, "they put me on pivoting on balanced 
staffs." He quit the firm in 1896 and farmed for three 
li 
I 
years. 
"I had been afraid I would be sick during those las t 
two years at the plant. I think it was the country life 
which saved my life. No, I don't think my work or condi-
tions in the plant had anything to do with me losing my 
health." 
When he returned to the Waltham company in 1898, t~e 
job of pivoting no longer existed: 11All the pivoters were 
gone." About 36 men had been employed at the extinct 
operation. 
Said Case H: 
"But I got back in the shop again and_ got the job 
which I was on for over fifty years--salvaging balances 
from the work which came back for repairs." 
During those ensuing fifty years, Case H was employ-
ed during the successive regimes of Ezra and Conover Fitch, 
Frederic c. Dumaine, Ira c. Guilden, and Paul Johnson. It 
is well to note that he could say little about the manage-
ments of Guilden and Johnson because, as he put it, "I had 
lost interest in the watch company after Dumaine had come 
there." 
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'~ II The closeness of Ezra Fitch with his employees was 
illustrated in Case H's words: il 
"Sure, I knew lVIr. Fitch well, and I was talking with II 
him just before he died. He was all right--a good man. 
But his son, who was a superintendent, wasn't capable of 
II 
II 
running the plant at all. I guess the son was all right in !\ 
his way, but his way was wrong 1" II 
Case H had difficulty in explaining young Fitch's I 
1
11 inability to run the company capably. He emphasized that 
I 
the firm failed to "go outside to get the help needed" when jl 
new production methods were introduced. Presumably the 
1
1 
result was to involve the employees in increasingly complex I· 
watchmaking processes. 
II 
It was during the waning years of the Fitch era that l 
the $8,000,000 debt grew to its staggering proportions, the \ 
debt which the Dumaine management later assumed. The 
company's instability was not unknown to the workers. 
"Why, Jimmy ----, who worked on screws on the whip-
lash regulator, told me when Fitch was president that if I 
had any stock I'd better sell out. He said he didn't know 
of anything Fitch had been in which hadn't failed. They 
were making those new watches all the time. First thing 
we knew, they were seven million dollars in debt. 
I 
II 
"Did you knov~ that they went to work and watered the 1 
stock. They were paying ten per cent dividends each year, 
I 
II 
I 
I heard, but anyone who had fifteen hundred dollars of the 
stock never could have gotten that price out of it." 
Case H firmly believes that the Waltham Watch 
Company made its name, reputation, and money on the 18 size 1 
and full-plate pocket watches. In accordance with consumer 11 
I 
tastes, the models tended to become smaller and less 
weighty. 
"I don't think the smaller ones ever were as good as 1: 
the larger ones. They can't stand the banging around. A \
1 
good bump and the pivot might fall out." 
The subject recalled that in the twilight days of 
the Fitch period that it was understood that the company 
was making one movement 'per capita each day. This, by his 
figures, would have meant about 3400 watches daily. But, 
selling the finished product seemed to be another matter. 
I 
"After the first war, things dropped back. They got ' 
the orders out. But Conover Fitch said they couldn't get 
them to sell. I don't know. I think it was nothing but 
mismanagement." 
Case H scooted his rocking chair closer to the 
viewer as if to introduce the Frederic c. Dumaine pres!-
dency at Waltham Watch. 
"Dumaine came in 1924 (the correct year was 1923) 1 
but he had the reputation of wrecking one of the big woolen \ 
mills around here. They (the Waltham employees) struck on 
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I 
him." 
Case H was referring to the much discussed Waltham 
strike of 1924. 
"I guess it wasn't so much of a strike as it was a 
run away. Dumaine had beat the life out of the mill up 
there, and now they were going to beat him. But they 
picked on the wrong man because he had too much money." 
The subject was one of 117 workers who continued at 
their jobs throughout the strike. He contended that the 
I 
II 
\( 
. . I 
company had a "blacklist" after the walkout 1 and anyone who 'II 
was on it "had a job in getting back." He saw no genuine ; 
I 
reason for the strike, and he used illustrations to make I 
his point. 
I 
"They'd voted for the strike, but lots of them didn~ ; 
know what they'd voted for. I remember hearing one fellow I 
named 1Blondie' yell to his friend who'd just walked out 
I of the plant and ask him what he was going out for. The 
I 
friend yelled back at him: 'Because I'm just a damned I 
fooll'" 
Case H revealed that he "made more money" when 
Dumaine was president than at any other period of his long 
employment. He didn't feel that Dumaine was "half so 
exacting" as "some of the fellows I had worked for before," I 
but he would "just as leave work under Dumaine as anyone , 
1
! 
else." 
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The Dumaine era saw the arrival of time studies in 
production methods with intentions of cutting corners on 
costs. 
"He (Dumaine) tried to put everything on piece work. 
I think that is one of the reasons why they got into diffi-
1
1!1 
culty. Why, I could make seventy-five cents to a dollar a 
I· 
I 
Ill A fellow watched me 
day more on piece work. They had some men come in who 
just sat around and watched you work. 
for three weeks, then he couldn't set a price for my job I 
and I had to set itl" 
Case H knew nothing about the alleged damage done to 
the Waltham reputation in management's attempt to utilize 
I 
American steel in mainspring production. However, his I 
comments on other deficiencies in the manufacture of watch I! 
movements were enlightening. 
"If a staff for a watch is not true, you've no need 
to put it in a watch. We had to change some of the staffs 
four times, and I know for a fact that they weren't made 
true. It looked to me as though someone had been doing it 
purposely. 
"The staffs were made at Waltham on our own machines 
I don't know whether the people who were doing the work 
didn't know their business or didn't care. The staffs were 
inspected, but whoever was doing it was only looking at one 
side." 
I 
! 
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The respondent leaned farther forward in his chair. I 
He seemed particularly concerned about this episode. J! 
"I knew one girl--she was a Czech--who was a cracke I 
jack at the inspecting job. A crackerjack! But she got 
mad and left the plant. They took a lot of the work she 
had thrown out and put 'em into watches%" 
Case H did not seem enthusiastic about production 
changes made during the presidency of Dumaine. A watch 
worker of the decades when precision handicraft demanded 
hours of skill and attention to each process, the responden 
lacked faith in machine methods. 
"I can remember that the handmade watches were in-
spected each and everyone. If they weren't perfect in 
every way, people didn't get paid for them. 
"After Dumaine came, they hired a fellow named 
Emmett and brought him here. He was paid ten thousand 
dollars a year to take the experience out of watchmaking! 
Mr. Fitch had always said it took fifteen years to make a 
good finisher. Now they tried to use machines instead of 
Ill 
I 
I 
I 
II 
I 
,I 
good men. He (Emmett) wasn't a watchmaker, but he had been i 
in some big machine works." I 
I 
Case H candidly brought forth another co~pany policy 
which perhaps effected the quality of the Waltham watch. 
He disclosed that "at the last" Waltham balances were being ~ 
made out of only one metal--brass. This, to his way of 
88 
thinking, did not allow for the hot-cold, expansion con-
traction compensation afforded by use of two metals which 
would react differently at the same temperature, thereby 
And people were proud to own a good watch." Then Case H 
shook his head sadly. 11But later they got some people in 
who didn't give a hoot, and it backed 'way down. They got 
in a different gang, and the older people who were there 
before and took an interest in their work ·left." I i 
the years of World ! Case H worked with Waltham through 
War II. He had a short "sick spell" in 1944 which confined 
him to the hospital. His lone condemnation of Swiss compe-
tition in the watch trade came in mentioning the war years. 
"?fuen we were on war work, they wouldn't allow us to 
work on anything except what would go to the government. 
They paid high wages, and no country on earth could compete 
with the foreign watches which came onto the market here at 
that time." 
' Regardless of the fact that he was not employed under 1 
Hagerty following resurrection of Waltham Watch by an RFC 
loan in 1949, Case H held opinions which he wanted to 
express. 
"I don't believe he (Hagerty) knew watchmaking. I 
understand he took off a lot of work which we always 
I 
I 
I, 
I! 
l 
I 
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considered essential--work essential because it brought 
things true (accurate). I don't dislike Mr. Hagerty, and 
I think he did the best he could. But you can't run a 
business you -don't know anything aboutJ" 
Case H was a member of the employees' union at 
Waltham. He highly praised Union President Walter w. 
Cenerazzo for his activities in attempting to coordinate 
the interests of the company and the workers. 
11He was always around looking things over. He didn' 
allow them to put any flaws in. It was the only union I 
ever belonged to, and it was very well run. In fact, it 
had a record with one down in Kentucky of being one of the 
best in the country. The last thing they did for me was to 
put my wages up to a dollar and five cents an hour. The 
president was always getting things done." 
Despite the contention that he would rather work 
under Dumaine than anyone else, Case H didn't think the 
Dumaine period constituted his "happiest" days with Waltham 
Watch. 
"I think my happiest days at Waltham was from the 
first time I went in there until they began breaking every-
thing up. That was after Dumaine came. He had a bad repu-
tation around here, but he wasn't as bad as I thought he 
was going to be." 
The general spirit of brotherhood within the plant 
I 
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often suffered slight ruptures if we are to judge by the 
recollections of Case H. He said that within the plant 
"there were lots of people who wanted to get your job." 
He had to fight for his on several occasions. However~ 
it seemed to him that the insidious intentions were 
peculiar "to the ' ones who couldn't have done your work if 
they wanted to." 
The subjec·t "got out" when he was approximately 85 
years old. He had a final thought about confused condi-
tions within the watch plant. 
"one of the last things they ever did was to send. 
me up five balances and ask me what they were. They didn't 
know~ but I knew what they were at a glance." 
The influx of a new type of worker into Waltham 
became apparent to Case H. He had carefully watched the 
work of a "fellow who did ammo work during the war," and 
had asked a superintendent to retain the young worker for 
employment as a "striker" when postwar layoffs were started. 
"I told the fellow to be careful and not to hurry 
on the job he was doing. It wasn't long before the work 
started coming back to us. In going through his work, I 
saw some little pieces which were twisted. He told me he 
just couldn't do them the way they should have been done. 
These new fellows just don't have the patience, I guess." 
He now has retired to his old fashioned home on a 
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quiet Waltham street. He interrupts his idle hours with 
frequent trips to "the cape." The aches and pains of the 
Waltham Watch Company no longer concern him • 
"After all 1 ° he asks 1 "isn't a fellow my age entitle~! 
to some loafing?" 
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CASE I 
Case I started to work in the machine shop in 1907. 
Working under the mechanical engineer, he stayed in that 
shop for five years. 
He transferred in 1912 to the experimental room to 
develop speedometers and remained there as a worker on 
models. 
He first worked on conometric speedometers, a very 
complicated instrument. However, this adaptation proved 
too expensive to warrant placing it on the market. 
A Waterloo, Iowa, man came to Waltham with an air 
friction type of speedometer. Soon seventy-five per cent 
of the cars in the country were equipped with this type, 
the air friction model. Waltham Watch hired a salesman 
from the Hoffeher Company of Boston who went out and made 
an immediate sale of 20,000 units. 
I 
I 
I 
The first car equipped was a Cadillac, although Ford ' 
was to eventually become the largest customer. Waltham 
built the first instrument panel for cars and the old 
Marmer was the first to install the "cluster panel." 
"A lot of employees left for New Haven at the start 
of World .War I, but I stuck and fared well for it. During 
the war my speedometer division was engaged in making 
tachometers for the United States Bureau of Standards. We 
also made airplane clocks for planes and tanks. After the 
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war we continued making a lot of tachometers, most of them l1 
I 
for Cub planes. :1 
"I worked right through the strike of '24. I was a 
technical worker and none of us or the salaried men went 
out. Standard Speedometer of South Boston got our speedo-
meter work on a leased contract. I went to South Boston 
every day just to check and see their production quality 
was equaling Waltham's specifications. 
"After the strike, from '26-'30, the speedometer 
proved to be the backbone of the company. It kept the 
plant running." 
I stated that he lost no time during the depression, \: 
although pay rates were cut. He stated that Dumaine was 1 
very much interested in the electric auto clock with which 
his department was experimenting. Respondent I recalled 
that Dumaine stated, "he'd build a plant one-half the size 
again of the existing one if they came up with a good 
electric auto clock." I said that Dumaine felt that there 
wasn't a good elec·tric auto clock on the market. 
Case I was enthusiastically favorable of Dumaine. 
"You're damn right I liked him. Why he took the plant over 1 
I 
when it was twelve million dollars in the hole and left it 
free and clear. 
' 
"He paid good, even gave us several bonuses during 
the war. When Dumaine was boss I always had a good car." 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I recalled that Dumaine always knew what was going 
on and took a pers .onal interest in his employees. "He was 
always being charitable without announcing it. The time I 
had all my teeth pulled I was out a week. The day I re-
turned one of the supervisors came up to me and said that 
the old man wanted me to take an extra two weeks off and 
at the same time he gave me Dumaine's personal check for 
one hundred dollars. Even though I didn't rate as a big 
shot, I attended many of their banquets on tickets he sent 
me. Even today I still go to Groton to check the clocks 
and speedometers on the Dumaine family cars." 
I held no stock in the company, but did recall that 
under Dumaine all foremen were allowed to buy a $100 share 
in the company. Even though these foremen were required to 1
1 
relinquish the stock when they left the shop, most did buy 
because of the high interest the stock paid. 
"I'd buy stock today if the old man were in there 
again. I consider him the keenest business man in the 
country today. 11 
Case I described the plant as "a beautiful place in 
which to work. They employed only high class people like 
in a fine Boston office. Everybody wore clean clothing. 
Our plant wasn't no Honky Tonk like in other manufacturing 
1 
lines. The bell would ring and we would all look just like !l 
I' 
bankers when we went out. It was a clean place with nice li 
I. 
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rest rooms. The old man was particular about them." 
I with regard to Guilden ••• 
"He made two big mistakes. The first was changing 
our sales policy from a jobber distribution system to that 
of a company retail set up. They _tell me that got the 
jewelers down on our Waltham Company. 
"His second mistake was his indifference to the 
speedometer trade. From 1922 on we were producing thirty-
five hundred a day. Under Guilden our production fell to 
fifteen hundred units daily. He lost our biggest account 
with Ford when they wanted to cut their speedometer vendors 
from three to two. They intended giving Waltham one-half 
of their business that was then being divided among Waltham'JI 
Stewart-Warner, and King Seeley. Evidently Guil~en didn't 1 
want the increased business, and we thus kept only the Fcrd 1 
commercial (truck) contract." 
I also was critical of "Guilden's cutting back on 
electric home clock production and for practically giving 
away the pickometer tools and dies." 
When Paul P. Johnson replaced Guilden as head of the 
I 
II 
I 
il 
I 
company I stated that he was forced to "loaf for three I 
months." After he did start back to work "it seemed we II 
were doing all right, and then everything went boom again." . 
I 
As for John Hagerty ••• 
"He was nothing but a politician, a handshaker; he 
96 
knew nothing about watches. He and his friends with their 
big salaries just sat around. They were a bunch of coat 
tail hanger-ons. 
"The half-price sale he instigated didn't hurt us 
as so many would have you believe. The jewelers who yelled 
the loudest were the credit jewelers, like those on Wash-
ington Street in Boston, who had never even handled our 
watches." 
Speaking of union president Walter W. Cenerazzo ••• 
"Although I didn't belong to the union, no technical 
or salaried men joined, I'll say he did a good job. He 
really put it over; that is he got us insurance, vacations 
with pay, and a retirement plan. When he did get something 
he got it for all of us, whether we were union members or 
I 
1 
·. not." 
r 
I attributes the company's trouble to "mismanagement 
since Dumaine left." "Its definitely not the workers 
because we have a good labor force. Our machinery is also 
all up to date. I view the Swiss competition as being only 
a secondary cause." 
I was most enthusiastic about the future once "we 
get back into production." 
"Just before we closed we received a fine watch 
order from the Thomas Long Company of Boston, one of the 
finest jewelry stores in the city. That is a store we 
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haven't done business with for many years. 
"We also were just getting into production with the 
best watch ever designed. A Swede of the old school told 
me that there was 1 no better watch anywhere'. 
"Until the trouble came we were a jump ahead of the 
trade with our patented speedometer. It was made of Alcino 
and could be made cheaper and better than any matching unit 
of our competitors. We had made some sample speedometers 
for Chrysler which had only one more cycle of testing to 
go before being accepted. They had passed the heat-cold 1 
and vibration tests. Only the road test remained for full 
acceptance when we closed down." 
Finally I felt that the company had a fine saleable 
product in a company patented watch timing machine that I 
had helped to perfect. "Most jewelers are hesitant about 
paying five to six hundred dollars for a watch timer. Ours 
is a machine of comparable performance which we could sell 
profitably for a hundred and fifty to a hundred and 
seventy-five dollars." 
As to the solution of the company's difficulty ••• 
"I'd like to see Mr. Dumaine back. He was aces with 
old Henry Ford and could probably get back the Ford speed-
-
ometer business. We'd need a live wire general manager. 
The old man would no doubt pick a good one and keep his 
thumb on him. Things would then start to boom a.gain at 
Waltham Watch.n 
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CASE J 
Case J was very hesitant in answering the intro-
ductory questions. His answers were very much influenced 
by a nod or shake of his son's head. It wasn't until the 
first hour of the interview had passed, and the son had 
left, that any real information worth recording was obtain-
ed from J. 
J started to work for the company as a jewel maker 
in 1924. "In those days we used to make most of our own 
jewels. Today we rnB.ke only the ones we can't buy from 
Switzerland. They have beat us out on most of the jeweled 
industry trade. 
''During the last war (World War II) the Germans 
wouldn't let the Swiss ship us any jewels. As a result of 
this action Elgin started to make their own. I even believe 
the General Electric laboratories made a number for the war 
effort, too. However, as soon as the war stopped we start-
ed importing again. 
"We used to make jewels for a lot of other watch 
companies--watches too. Some companies would get orders 
for more watches than they could manufacture. We would 
then make some movements for them and put their name on the 
fa,ce. We did that for Smith-Patterson, Tiffany's, and the 
Ball Watch Company. The Russians bought the latter 
and moved it to Russia • 
company 1 
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"I hadn't hardly started to work when we went out on 
strike in 1924. I worked as a painter for nine months 
until they called me back." 
I knew Mr. Dumaine well enough to say hello ••• 
"When he would come by I'd always say hello to him. 
I knew the boys real well. Spike Dumaine was a good fellow 
to work for. 
"There wasn't one year that Dumaine didn't make 
money. I believe the company was twelve million dollars in 
debt when he took it over; when he left the debt was less 
than four millions. His _ inventory of over seven millions, 
which didn't include the building, more than covered the 
indebtedness. Those figures are the RFC's. I cut them 
out of the paper. I save all statements like that for 
future reference. 
11The old man paid more than most places. He did cut 
wages, but he raised them afterwards. If you worked he 
paid you. 
"He was rough and tough. Don't you think he wasn'tJ 
There was no fooling when he was with us. He knew that to 
make money you had to attend to business. 
"He used to hold weekly meetings with his foremen 
and the higher-ups. He gave them quotas of how much to 
sell and how much to produce. If they couldn't make their 
quotas then he would find someone who could. 
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"Dumaine knew what it cost to get material out of a 
room. In some instances he gave the foremen forty per cent 
of any additional savings they could make above his set 
figures. You can bet those foremen kept everybody wide 
awake." 
I got laid off for a year during the depression ••• 
"When things got tough during the depression I was 
laid off for a year. I took a job with Standard Oil until 
the company rehired me. 
"It wasn't long before I worked my way up to job 
master. That position is more important than foreman. I 
think that the foremen and their assistants are closer to 
the door than anyone else. What I mean is they aren't too 
valuable. 
"Even Mr. Dumaine felt that production workers were 
more important than foremen. Once a kid was fired for 
fooling. Mr. Dumaine met him on the way out and got the 
story. He and the kid went back to see the foreman. The 
old man told the foreman that he could be replaced and a 
new foreman trained in twenty minutes, but that it took 
three years to start making a profit on a production worker. 
He figured that the first year a new kid in production cost 
the company a thousand dollars on damaged parts." 
The union came in '41 ••• 
Mr. 
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Cenerazzo is a smart man, though, He's tough, too; but if 
he was soft we wouldn't get anywhere. Sure I know him 
personally. He got us some pay raises, but the war helped, 
too. 
"He fixed it so that we could smoke in the can 
(toilet). Some of the workers abused the privilege. My 
old foreman would send a girl down to the door to call any-
one back if they took too long. If someone under him 
wasn't producing, they didn't stay." 
"I think we made a mistake when we pulled out of 
the A.F. of L. They have six million members. Washington 
would listen to our troubles if we had the big voice they 
represent. 
"As I understand it Leon Williams, the head of the 
jewelers union, said we'd never get back in with them. 
However, he's died recently. I don't know what will come 
off at their (A.F. of L. jewelers) convention next year." 
Trouble started under Guilden ••• 
"Anyone smart enough to think will tell you that 
the trouble sta.rted under Guilden. He was related to 
Bulova by marriage. I read in a New York paper that he 
was married to Bulova 1 s daughter ~ctually he was married 
to his sister]. 
"Ther e were times, under hlm, when we had cases and 
no movements and vice versa. He even got us in bad with 
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the Keystone Watch Company when he put in a big order for 
cases and then cancelled it. I understand they had already 
made up the order. 
"He made the big mistake of cutting us off from the 
jobbers who had previously marketed our output. Everyone 
knows that the jobbers had done a terrific advertising job 
and had large sales forces. 
"Another mistake he made was not to back up the 
watches. We still gave a guarantee, but Guilden felt that 
once a person bought the watch it was up to him to take 
care of it. That policy didn't go over with either the 
jobbers or the customers. 
"\~en Guilden was in charge the help didn't know 
who was president, but they did know the general manager." 
A funny thing about John Hagerty ••• 
"He was the one who looked after the RFC money and 
things went screwy. Can you imagine their shuting off 
their own manager? Then after he left here he got a better 
job. 
"Not all the jewelers were able to get watches for 
the half price sale. Filene's took so many that the 
Waltham people had to go to Boston to buy them. Weston's 
and Cronin's, two Waltham stores, got a few. In most cases 
the half price sale made the jewelry stores mad. 
"We did have one good man here while Hagerty was 
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around. His name was Mr. Lee Cherade. I think the stock-
holders called him in. At any rate he found out that we 
were duplicating machinery that we already had. The new 
Swiss machinery was good, but was there a need to buy new 
stuff when the old was still all right. 
"Someone must have been getting a cut on the purchase 
of this new machinery. The RFC held back two millions 
which they insisted could only be spent on new machines. 
It was the opinion of ninety per cent of us in the shop 
that someone wanted a rakeoff. 
''There wasn't much sense in buying new machines 
when you would have nothing to work them with. You wouldn~ 
buy new stuff for your own home when you were going in the 
hole." 
I' 11 get by ••• 
"I had a chance to go to Providence to work in a 
place where they make those flexible bracelets. I turned 
it down because I want to stay around here. My family is 
one and my expenses are small. I own this duplex and my 
son lives on the other side of the house. 
"If I have to I'll open my own small watch and jewel 
setting place. I've some nice machinery in the cellar. I 
know I'd get all the work I could do if I offered a twenty 
four hour service on repairs. 
"This closing has hurt the merchants of Waltham, 
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too. Today most of us will spend twenty-five cents where 
once we spent a dollar. I was planning to buy a television 
set. That will have to wait now, which means that some 
Waltham dealer has lost the price of a television set until 
I am working again. 
What is the trouble? 
"I agree with what they told me at the union office. 
What we need to do is to equalize the Swiss at the border. 
We don't want any favors. Just · s-et the tariff so that the 
imports will hit the market at the same price as do our 
finished watches. Then we would have to do a selling job 
to come out on top. 
"or course Guilden was the cause of the RFC in the 
first place. Still I don't know why they pulled out, we 
didn't default on our loan." 
There is a way out ••• 
"A man like Dumaine could bring us back. We don't 
know too much about the others who are after the company. 
11There is money in the small precision stuff. I 
mean the custom parts section. Firms send us their blue-
prints and we make their articles. That work ties in with 
our five nice machine shops. 
"There is also a wartime need for the timing indus-
try. Remember what I said about the Swiss jewels during 
the last war. 
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''I think we also should have a. clause put in the 
union contract dealing with the older employees. Anybody 
that keeps working when they have enough money is only 
hurting himself. 
"I ~ow of one instance in which a. ma.n was fired by 
old ma.n Dumaine~ He got a. job-with a Boston department 
store and eventually was retired by them. The next thing 
we knew he was back working at Waltham. That's the kind 
of thing I mean. When I hit sixty-five, I'll take my 
pension. 
"The new owner will have to open soon before the 
labor force is gone. First thing you know one fellow will 
get a. job in Chicago or New ~ersey and then he will be 
sending for his friends. 
"one thing the next owner will have to do for sure. 
That is to get rid of the inventory, and not at any half 
price sale either. That's badJ 
"I think Bulova would like to get the Waltham name 
or trade name. He would be able to get a better price for 
his Swiss movements if they had our name. You could order 
either name and get it from the same factory if he gets 
the plant. 
"He's got the money to buy. I've heard that he 
spends more on advertising than the three American compa-
nies make in profits. ! . understand our (Waltham, Elgin and 
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Hamilton) combined production is only a million movements a 
year, while he assembles over four millions. 
te will open again ••• 
"I know that we will reopen. Who will run the 
place, I can't say. But I'll be there, I like the place 
or I wouldn't have stayed for over twenty-five years." 
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CASE K 
It was a hot afternoon. 
"I hope this doesn't take too long," said Case K. 
"I have to buy a pair of wash pants this afternoon, them 
I'm taking the family away for the weekend. 
He was a young man of 29 years, one of the later 
generations of employees of the Waltham Watch Company. Of 
French descent, he was the son of a Waltham watchworker 
and was born at Newton, Mass., on May 5, 1921. His family 
later lived at Lowell, Mass., before moving to Waltham in 
1935, and the subject became employed at the Waltham plant 
shortly after his graduation from high school in 1939. 
"I graduated from high school in June and went in 
Waltham in August," Case K stated. "I went directly into 
the finishing school and after going completely through it, 
I doubled back and learned mat~hing. I decided I liked 
matching better and stuck to that." 
He pointed out that "matching" in the watch craft 
is "lining up the escapement and working on t he pallet." 
According to him, all the works of a watch are centered on 
the "pallet." He declared his job was "to free the balance 
in order to have it free so that the finisher could finish" 
the f~nal product. 
Raised in a family which derived its livelihood from 
the Waltham Watch Company, Case K disclosed he always had 
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had a desire to work in the watch plant. Then he added: 
"But I don't have it nowl" 
The interviewer asked him to explain his change in 
attitude. 
"When I go back (should the Waltham Company reopen), 
I'd like to get in the machinists' school under the GI Bill. 
I'd like to continue on to be a tool and die maker. Then 
I could go in ·someplace else. I know the fellow next door 
says that if he could get five, ten or fifteen die makers, 
he could put them places." 
He gave no further reasons for desiring to leave 
Waltham other than the facts that he felt he would enjoy 
tool and die making better and that it would be "bigger" 
work. 
World War II separated him from the Waltham Watch 
Company. 
"I was matching right along, then in 1942 I went 
into the Service. I was in the Service thirty-eight months 
and, after I got out, I went back to the watch company at 
the end of November in 1945. When I came back I went right 
into matching on a different size than I was used to, but 
it didn't handicap me. I always seemed to have the knack 
of doing it from one size to another without losing speed." 
His job as a "matcher" continued until his layoff 
following the company's first bankruptcy closure in 
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Decernber 1 1948. He returned to his same position in June 1 
1949 1 when Waltham was reopened on an RFC loan, then was II 
1: 
dismissed again on October 7 1 1949 1 when the plant again lj 
shut its doors. He has not worked since. I 
I 
Case K had come to Waltham during the management of I 
Frederic c. Dumaine. He was not without opinions regarding 
the manner in which President Dumaine operated Waltham 
Watch. 
I 
"My general opinion is that the plant should be run 
the way he ran it in a lot of respects. I know that some 
of the people figured they were worth more than they were 
being paid. But everytime I felt I had a raise coming, 
I went up and showed them in black and white and I got my 
raise. I did that twice." 
1: 
He recalled that work during the Dumaine management 
was done under what he called a ·"group system." He ex-
plained it this way: 
"That was the method of a watch starting at one end 
of a bench and going around the bench in a circle until it 
was finished. One job boss and a unit leader took care of 
the same watch through the entire process, which placed 
responsibility. 
"In a group you had a quota to fill out each week. 
I 
I 
We had a rate 1 of say 1 a dollar and a quarter an hour and 
had to put out five hundred watches a week. If you put out [I 
ll 
110 
five hundred and fifty watches, you got a percentage of 
the work. If you did less, they figured out something to 
speed things up--like taking off one of the finishers." ! 
He pointed out that he did not believe the quota 
system had a tendency to speed up work, with a resulting 
lowering of the quality of work put into the Waltham 
~atches. He explained that the inspectors always were 
quite thorough in their jobs. 
"Personally, I had no complaints against Mr. 
Dwnaine," ' said Case K. "I've only heard people talk about 
things they thought were wrong with him, but I have to 
know for myself." 
When Case K returned to Waltham in November, 1945, 
Ira c. Guilden was president of the firm. The respondent 
worked under Guilden until the latter's resignation in 
June of 1948 {approximately two and one-half years), but 
only had this to say of his top executive: 
"Guilden wasn't there long enough for me to draw 
an opinion. From what I understand, he was trying to do 
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in the Service: 
"Under Guilden when I came back, they didn't have 
the group system any longer. It was more of a room system. 
All the different operations sat together, and a watch I 
This method Jl wasn't assembled at just one bench any longer. 
was all piece work. If you did a hundred dollars worth 
of work, you got it--providing it was all okayed." 
The output of watches was greater under the post-
war plan, according to Case K. But he added that he be-
lieved the timepieces were more expensive to produce in 
the. t manner. 
I 
I 
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li 
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"Besides, wages and costs were up everywhere. When jj 
I left in 1942, I was making a dollar and a quarter an !I 
hour. And when I came back it was a dollar fifty-five. 
Now it's up to a dollar eighty-six. I 
"Under this system you could pick out the people who lj 
were slow," he said. "To me the majority of the older 
people knew how to do their work and were very good, but 
they weren't as fast. But this didn't have a tendency to 
slow up operations since it was all piece work. If they 
fell behind in any operation, they would just put more 
people on that job by switching around a bit." 
Case K stated that he had spoken "personally" to 
President Paul P. Johnson on several occasions and de-
scribed Guilden's managerial successor as "an easy-going 
II 
I 
J 
II 
II 
I 
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fellow." 
"I think Johnson would have liked to do a lot of 
things for Waltham1 but he didn't seem to have the coopera-
tion he needed." Case K couldn't explain what he meant. 
He shrugged his shoulders. "You know 1 nothing just seemed 
to click." 
He remembered that Johnson made efforts to decrease 
the unit cost of the Waltham watch. In order to achieve 
this end, Johnson had relied on numerous time studies 
throughout the plant. 
"But it's kind of hard to study an individual," 
commented Case K. "You know just exactly what a machine 
will do, but in a watch plant individuals and their work 
vary from day to day. For instance, some days the pallets 
will be all off and on other days they'll be perfect, You 
can't figure human elements on paper. 
"Yet I think Johnson was trying," he concluded. 
Case K said he believed the only achievement which 
would allow American made watches to compete successfully 
with Swiss products would be reduction of the unit cost in 
manufacturing. He didn't have any ideas how it might be 
done: "That would be up to the technical men." 
What about the management of John Hagerty? 
II 
II 
"Hagerty? Well 1 that's another thing about what 
people said. Personally, I didn't know what he was trying , 
I! 
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to do or what his intentions were. He looked like a 
political plum to me." 
Case K placed the blame for Waltham's financial 
plight on Swiss competition: 
"I couldn't say for sure what happened to the 
company, but the Swiss imports did hurt it. You read in 
all the magazines where seventeen-jewel watches of theirs 
are selling for fifteen or twenty dollars. You can't 
match those prices here. 
"As for management, I think they were trying. But 
there's a lot of politics in it on the Swiss end. Guys 
like Taft (Senator Robert A.)--he owns a lot of shares in 
Bulova. A lot of people wanted these imports to keep 
coming in. As long as they're making a good hunk of 
change, they don't care." 
The respondent added that the union had been doing 
much to protect the workers' interests, and he termed it 
"a good union that does a lot for us." I 
Case K got i His small daughter came onto the porch. 
up from his chair. I[ 
"I'm afraid that's all the time I can give you. I'mll 
I 
taking the family away for the weekend, and I have to buy 
that pair of wash pants before I go." 
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CASE L 
Case L started to work for the company in 1917 at 
one of the machine tool benches. At that time Waltham 
Watch made over 90 per cent of its own machines. He 
roughly estimated that the present machine shop force of 
150 men to be about half the number employed in the shop 
just prior to World War I. 
Subject L hadn't been long employed when he left 
the company to go to New Haven to work for the Marlin 
Firearms Company. He stated that the Marlin Company who 
talked "about a hundred and twenty-five of us from all 
departments into moving to New Haven. This man stressed 
the patriotic angle and the higher pay we would and did 
receive. · The Watch Company hadn't started on war work as 
yet." 
They told Subject L that 11he would never get back 
into the shop", but after the war he did return to his 
bench. It does not appear that his temporary desertion 
affected his standing with the company for he rose to 
1
1 
become job master, assistant foreman, foreman, and assist-
ant general superintendent of the factory. 
The era of Frederic c. Dumaine was one that L re-
called easily and spoke of with a feeling of "the good old 
days." He knew the company's financial position when 
Dumaine took over and when he left. He stated that Dumaine jl . 
ll 
115 
"liked to fight" and had "a record of fighting that he 
brought with him from Amoskeag." 
"Dumaine didn't pay top wages, but then he didn't 
pay the lowest wages either. If you produced you were 
rewarded. Dumaine had a good record in that he never 
missed a pay day. Since he left there have been times 
when I 1 ve had to carry my check around for a month before 
I could cash it. Why if he took over the company again we 
would all be down at the plant ready to work tomorrow.~ 
The plant was struck in '24 and L went out with the 
rest of the men. "I got a job driving a big gas truck and 
managed to get by all right. A local union was formed but 1 
folded when we went back to work. Nobody really gained by 
the strike. Ever know of an instance in which anyone 
gained by striking? Most of us went right back to our old 
jobs after the trouble was settled." 
Evidently L carried no bitterness against the com-
pany for he repeatedly described it as a "nice place to 
work." "Why Mr. Dumaine was always having the place paint-
ed." He was 11 always trying to make the place cleaner; he 
even ripped up some of the old floors and replaced them 
with new ones." 
~~en the depression hit, L was dropped down a notch 
to foreman. He stated that pay rates were reduced to 
accomplish two important factors--"to reduce the inventory ' 
!I 
i' 
I 
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and to keep everyone working." Evidently this policy 
worked, for L stated that he had almost continuous employ-
ment during the business recession. 
The respondent stated that he was "old fashioned" 
in that he couldn't see much advantage in buying Swiss 
machinery. However, he believed that some of the imported 
machinery was good and some was not so good. "We still 
have some bridge equipment that is 50 or more years old. 
That ought to prove that our American equipment is really 
made to last. j 
"We have a good labor force at Waltham. Many of the ,I 
·I 
workers have come from as tar away as Texas to learn the I 
trade. Today there aren't too many of the younger employees 
from Waltham. We don't have many father-son combinations 
in our plant." 
Speaking of changes that occured when Ire. c. Guilden J 
I replaced Dumaine, L felt that Guilden's policy of ceasing I 
I to manufacture electric clocks and pickometers hurt the 
company. L also felt that "Guilden showed little interest I 
in the speedometer or custom machine trade." "Guilden's 
sole interest tended to be in producing watches with only 
slight emphasis upon the company's other diversified 
products. 
"When Paul P. Johnson replaced Guilden he cut the 
hours from 40 to 35 each week." L felt that Johnson erred 
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"in bringing the men back to work in spite of the huge 
inventory of watches already on hand." 
I 
L did see fit to credit both Guilden and Johnson for i 
jewelers when he refused to allow Waltham Watches to be 
II 
sold except on "first floor" jewelry stores. II 
L felt that Johnson's switching from jewelry jobbers ~~ 
I; "who had many salesmen under them" to the company's "un-
trained sales force" was another factor making for jeweler 1: 
opposition to the company's products. 
Both of Dumaine's successors, Guilden and Johnson, 
were credited with realizing the "value of advertising" 
which the old man had severely curtailed. 
L felt that "kids today don't consider anything 
except the price of a watch and the advice the jeweler 
gives them. Everybody knows the jeweler gets a better 
profit from selling the imported watch and hence doesn't 
push our watches." 
When the vanguard of Walter W. Cenerazzo's union 
appeared on the scene in 1945, L "didn't figure they would 
last six weeks." "But that Cenerazzo is a smart man and 
has some good and some not so good men in his union." 
I 
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L said that he attended a meeting at which Cenerazzo 
Johnson as tta man fit to be president of the United States • . 
Although L had never before purchased stock in any company, ! 
he attributed the union chief's speech to motivating him tol; 
purchase company stock. He stated that "I was not alone 1
1 
among the employees who were so swayed to invest of their 
savings in the company prior to its closing." 
Subject L stated that a Watch Assembler School was 
established at the plant in conjunction with the city. He 
said that it was at the request of nearby Jeweler Associa-
tions that this school for training approximately 100 
pupils was founded. The individual jewelers had been 
experiencing difficulty in finding trained personnel to 
handle the Waltham Watch movements. 
I! 
I 
I L did not feel that the company had lagged behind li 
its competitors by not standardizing its parts until the 
II 
depression and by not working with interchangeable parts I 
until 1938. He stated that "watches were still being 
individually built up until about 1932." 
II 
II 
He attributed no 11 
importance to this late arrival of the production belt at I 
Waltham. i 
The installation of John Hagerty, former RFC Commis-
sioner for Boston, as new company President brought no 
relief to the company, according to Subject L. 
"How can you expect that man and his assistants from li 
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other RFC offices to know anything about making watches? 
He continued many of the sales practices of Guilden and I 
Johnson a.nd introduced one of his own, the half price sale . li 
He didn't allow all jewelers the same bargain. There were !1 
instances in which one jeweler had the half price sale and i!. 
I his competitor next door was still selling at the old price , 
since he hadn't been included among the favored retailers. ~ 
I 
"I honestly believe that we were on the road back in : 
January of this year. Our sales were high and with our new 
sales manager we were getting good orders for speedometers. 
I think that the banking interests in Boston were behind 
much of this good change in policy. 
watch making machinery. 
"I know that if we do reopen the company will have 
a tough time making peace with the jewelers, but the fact 
that Hagerty is gone will count for a lot with them. 
"I, myself, would like to see the Dumaine family 
take the company back again. The old man's sons, Spike 
and Buck, could run the plant. They did it before for 
their father." 
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CASE M 
"The people like to work there. There are few who 
work at Waltham who don't come back." 
Case M, a balding transplanted Rhode Islander who 
was born at Lincoln and remembers joining his family in 
' Waltham, Mass., when he was "sixteen or seventeen or some-
ple.ce along in there," was expressing his attitudes of' the 
Waltham Watch Company. Both he and his wife have been un-
employed since the company's shutdown in February, 1950, 
which deepens his concern for the bankruptcy proceedings 
in Federal Court. 
"If Dumaine (Frederic c.) gets the company, we'll 
I 
work steady," he predicted. "If Bulova gets it, we won •t! " 1: 
Case M had gone to work at the Waltham Watch Company !, 
about 1917. He confessed he couldn't give the exact year I 
on the spur of the moment because "I didn't pay much at ten- II 
tion. 11 He worked in Waltham's dial department for nearly 
a year, then went into the Service during World War I. 
"After the Service, I went back in the factory," the 
subject recollected. "That was sometime in 1919, and I 
worked in the dial department then, too. Then I left the 
dial department and got down in the finishing department. 
I learned to work on the watches, finishing--or what they 
call 'jobbing.' I also worked in the assembly room and 
1: 
I 
Jl 
learned 'setting up 1 and all the rest of the work that goes 1 
I 
with being an assembler." 
He was then employed on finishing for 11 I don't know 
how many years--ten or twelve." After that, Case M said 
he was switched to 'jobbing,' which is the finishing of 
new watches. That was in 1938. 
"Along about that time I went into what they call 
'case jobbing.' That is the 'jobbing' of watches that havel·l 
already been cased, and I was at that until the place 
closed." 
He settled back in his chair, apparently content 
with his rapid coverage of three decades. The interviewer 
asked him for his retentions concerning the management of 
Frederic c. Dumalne. 
I 
I 
"Sure, I remember a lot about Dumaine. You'd always l 
see him around a lot, and he was a very pleasant old fellow 
who seemed to have a nice personality. You'd see his boy, 
Buck, Jr., around too. And he was always pleasant to talk 
with." 
He added an afterthought: 
"But Boucher (I.E.) was really the man in charge. 
Boucher was kind of a funny fellow in a way. He wouldn't 
stand for any monkeying around. If something was wrong, 
it had to be fixed." 
Case M said he was forced out of work by production 
I 
I 
I 
stoppages resulting from the controversial strike of 1924. 11 
In speaking about the intentions behind the str ike, he said: 
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"That's something that's hard to figure out. It 
all started in another room that I didn't have anything to 11 
do with. When the thing got rolling, you had no choice 
about staying or going. Work moves from one place to 
another in a watch factory, you know. A tie-up works all 
the way along the line. 
"Some groups started something in regard to wages. 
Some wages were cut and the men didn tt want to accept them. II 
But I wasn't in that department. And at that time there 11 
was no union, no nothing." \! 
The 'unit' system which was tried under Dumaine's \ 
management was well-remembered by Case M. II 
I 
"That didn't seem to work out so well. It caused r: 
quite a bit of discontent. If you saw the man right next 
to you making ten or fifteen cents an hour more than you. 
you wouldn't be happy. Too, the units which had faster 
people on them would pile ahead of those which were slower. I\ 
They were always at each others' throats to hurry up." 
\I 
Case M recalled the episode of the effort to use 
American steel in Waltham mainsprings instead of the higher II 
grade Swedish steel. He confessed that the period was "one 1\ 
of the times when the watch did go down." The decline was 
blamed on the company's efforts to manufacture as many 
watches as possible, and he said he imagined "they bought 
steel wherever they could get it." 
i\ 
"one thing always impressed me, though. If Dumaine 
got a bunch of watches ahead, Boucher would go out and sell 
them. I don't know where, but he sold them. Anymore I 
don't know where he could sell them if he wanted to with 
all the Swiss competition around." 
The respondent made it clear that he considers the 
management which followed Dumaine as "very, very poor." He 
spoke his opinions of President Ira C. Guilden with frank-
ness: 
"He (Guilden) did the best job of mismanagement that 
I have ever seen done. As far as we can figure it out, 
Guilden was in there to ruin the place for the Swiss. Why, 
he used to come in and give an order that so many watches 
had to be cased up. Vlhen they were done, he's countermand 
his order and have them uncased. On one occasion he had 
thousands of watches dialed, then undialed--for no good 
reason at all." 
Case M reported that there were instances in the 
"plate" department when inspectors didn't look at their 
machines "for weeks." In the meantime, the machines were 
turning out "bad parts all the while." 
"We got a lot of that stuff under Mr. Guilden, but 
there was little or none of it under Dumaine and Boucher. 
Things like that cost Waltham thousands of dollars." He 
shook his head emphatically and added: "After Guilden got 
1 24 
in there, the place went down, down, down." 
Case M wasn't too certain of his sentiments about 
Paul P. Johnson's career at Waltham because "he (Johnson) 
wasn't there long enough." However, he didn't think 
Johnson understood the watch business, and the respondent 
feels that successful management "really takes a man who 
has been among watches." 
His opinion held for President John Hagerty: 
"He just didn't know what he was doing. He didn't 
\~ 
i 
know anything about the business, and those who were advis- Ji 
ing him, if they did know anything about watches, didn't \ 
show itl I 
II 
"I should say that they did have a man named Mr. --- j; 
in there who knew what he was doing. He seemed to know 
where to go and look for mistakes. I know he was there 
when it closed last time, and he had things going so well 
towards the end that we were surprised that we were laid 
off. Business had picked up and the orders were coming in. jl 
"As for the factory closing, you can believe anybody ! 
I 
I myself put it more to Swiss watches. That's the trouble 
I 
with this country; those that import get double the profits. ! 
I 
There's nothing that they can't do cheaper in those foreign 1 
countries." I 
Case M is disturbed by the presence of Swiss person-
nel in the Waltham plant. 
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"They have some Swiss people in the technical de-
partment now designing dials. I don't see why they can't 
have some good Americans in there. I know that one of 
them did thousands of dials which he afterwards decided 
didn't even fit the cases. We have just as smart men in 
this country as they have in Switzerland." 
His look became one of great concern. 
~ou know, it looked to me for a long while like 
they {the Swiss) were trying to sabotage the place." Asked 
for an explanation, he added: "oh, just little things they 
do that you wouldn't pay much attention to." 
Case M contends that the Waltham watch always has 
been a good product. He feels that jewelers would handle 
the watch more readily and sell greater numbers if parts 
and repairs were assured--"that's another thing Guilden 
did; he sold them without allowing comebacks." The subject 1 
believes Walthams are unsurpassed for durability and styles J1 
"But there was a number six-seventy-five watch which l
1 
. "And it was a lemonl I came out under Guilden," he said. 
Ill It just wouldn't keep time. The parts didn't line up, but 
li 
he {Guild en) wouldn't do anything about it. I don't think 1
1 
it was designed right." II 
The younger generations of workers aren't as "loyal" IJ 
to the company as are the older employees, Case M declared. !· 
He stated that the younger people's work is just as good, J! 
in fact sometimes better--"but the younger generations, no 
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matter where they work, just don't want to get up some 
mornings." 
The pleasantness of working conditions at Waltham 
were emphasized by Cas.e M: 
"All the people like to work there. There are few 
who have worked at Waltham who don't come back. There's 
I 
a saying we have for those who are leaving: 'Leaving? Well, 1 
. I 
you'll be backl' You have to produce your share of the 
work, but they don't drive you. The younger ones like it, 
too. They'll go out and get another job, but they'll come 
back. It's clean and nice work." 
Case M declared that the employees' problems are 
greatly relieved by the work of the union. 
"we have a good union, and we have a wonderful man 
at the head of it--Mr. Cenerazzo (Walter W.). He's the 
best union leader in the worldl They'll correct anything 
you bring to their attention. But they don't let people 
loaf. The union will stand back of the people and fight 
for them. Mr. Cenerazzo is a great man--you can slap him 
down today, but he'll be right back up and at you 
tomorrowJ" 
Case M's concern for the future did not go 
unexpressed. 
"I think if Dumaine gets the place it will go." 
Then he warned: 
.1 2 7 
11But, of course, we can't meet the Swiss the way 
I 
I\ 
,, 
I. 
I, 
Even ~~ 
Bulova has six hundred laid off, and Elgin and Hamilton 
things are unless we 1 re willing to work fQr nothing. 
are in the same fix. Look in any drug store. It's all 
Swiss watches! Gripes, they can't begin to make them here 
at the prices we see. Unless the government puts on a 
tariff, I don't see how we're going to do any good here." 
He explained the reorganization plans .now being 
heard in Federal Court as follows: 
"Dumaine's plan is the only one I can see. With 
speedometers and eight-day clock production, they should 
be able to pull along okay. 
"Bulova said they only applied for Waltham because 
no one else wanted it. But Dumaine wants itl So why 
I 
li 
I 
1! 
II 
II 
I 
II 
to close 
1 
future here l 
doesn't Bulova drop out now? Because they want 
it down--you can bet on thatl We can't see any 
if Bulova gets it. He won't hire enough people to begin 
with, and it'll just be a finishing line. They get all 
their parts from Switzerland. 
"But, we're hopeful anyway," he concluded. 
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CASE N 
Case N was a red-faced Irishman who, at first, "was 
damned if he was going to be interviewed." "Go to the 
union or the company if you want information, I'll tell 
you nothing. I'm not going to be made a sucker twice in 
one lifetime." 
N then related how a Boston newspaper had deceived 
him into having his picture taken while doing the family 
chores. Evidently the reporter had misrepresented himself 
to N, for instead of having "my information aid the judge 
at the hearing," he found his picture and story on the 
front page of a Boston newspaper. The interview that 
follows was granted only after the interviewer had shown 
his credentials to all the members of N's family. 
N began the interview by remarking that "machinery 
comes natural to me." "Even as a kid I used to take my 
dollar watch apart and then reassemble it. I guess that 
is why they made me an automatic machine operator when I 
started with the company in 1923. 
"I hadn't worked very long before the whole plant 
went out on strike. I did various odd jobs until they 
called me back in 1925. Because I came right back when 
they called I didn't lose any of my senority." 
Things were different in those days ••• 
"our old foreman were master mechanics in those 
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days. They knew their machines. Today they don't have 
too much to do with the machines because they are so busy 
with their paper work. 
"Our production methods have changed also. When I 
first started working in the twenties all the parts of a 
single watch were numbered. We didn't start to work with 
interchangeable parts until the late thirties. I think 
the old style of assembling was better. However, I 1d guess 
that competition has forced the change. 
I knew the Dumaine boys well ••• 
"I didn't know old man Dumaine personally. I did 
know his boys, Spike and Buck, very well. 
"The old man was a tough guy to work for. He was 
a hard headed businessman. If he gave you a dollar he 
wanted a dollars worth of work in return. He had to take 
this attitude because our competition was so keen. 
"I understand the old man made eighteen million I 
II 
A fellow 1; 
from the union told me that he paid off a debt of seven 
1
1 
dollars profit in the time he owned the factory. 
millions in his twenty-two years. 
"The old man figured that to make the place pay we 
had to make a watch a day for each person employed in the 
factory. 
"Dumaine was tough on the stockholders. They were 
always after him. I guess few know the real reason why he 
I 
I 
It 
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sold his interest in the company." 
Mr. Guilden took the place over ••• 
"You couldn't put in print what I think about that 
guy. He had a big line of baloney. Talk about your poli-
ticians. 
11He spouted about increasing the production and then 
he started cutting. First he let the speedometer trade 
drop and then the custom parts. I've always felt that if 
we broke even on the watch production it was these extras, 
like the speedometer and custom parts, that earned the 
profit. 
"Finally he switched from selling through the 
jobbers to a method of dealing direct with the jewelers. 
That might be all right for Bulova and the other importers, 
but not for us. You need a big sales force to really sell 
watches." 
Walter Cenerazzo couldn't be bought ••• 
"I honestly didn't think the union had a chance of 
succeeding. Mr. Cenerazzo proved to be a man that couldn't 
be bought. We had had other attempts at unionization that 
had failed. 
but its like 
You couldn't prove the others were bought out, , 
a pitcher that nearly beans a ball player. If 
II 
the fellow on the mound repeatedly dusts off your batters 
you get suspicious. 
"The union has helped a lot. They got us social 
I 
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security, an old age pension, and sick and accident 
benefits. Even if I'm hurt at home now I'm covered by 
company insurance. The union also helped straighten out 
wages and made the seniority lists. 
"We are an independent union. At one time we were 
attached to the A.F. of L. In a way we got more backing 
from them. The other two American companies, Elgin and 
Hamilton, wouldn't join the A.F. of L. jewelers union. So 
in order to get those two companies to join us we had to 
break with the A.F. of L. 
"At least we now belong to a group in which we have 
something to say about how it is to be run. I don't think 
we have done too bad as things have worked out. 
"our union president is hard boiled, but he has to 
be. I've never heard him yet say no to a guy he thought 
he could help. He does more than just sit around and 
collect his money. 
"The truth is Mr. Cenerazzo goes out of his way to 
do a lot of things he doesn't really have to do. Like 
going to Washington and fighting with the senators about 
the reciprocal trade treaties." 
Something went wrong under Hagerty ••• 
flNo one can figure it out. The RFC said we were 
doing all right and still they blamed the failure on the 
company. 
1 3 2 
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"There has been a lot of talk about how Hagerty 
hurt us with the half price sale. At the time the New York 
papers were full of half price watch sales. Gruen, Bulova, 
Hamilton and the others were all having them." 
When Case N was asked if the other companies were 
forced to sell at reduced prices because of Waltham's 
action he replied: "We had to sell at half price because 
of the others doing so before us." 
It is mostly the fault of the Swiss ••• 
"I don't think it was fair for the Swiss to flood 
the market when we were on war work. They had a big jump 
on us because you can't reconvert overnight. 
"I wouldn't give you fifty cents for the stack of 
Swis s machines we got. They are all right but there is 
too much handling to them. Some of ours are a hundred 
years ahead of them. 
"I know some of their machines will do only two 
operations. One of our machines will do what ten girls 
can do on imported stuff. One man can run three of our 
automatic machines. Ours are better because if they break 
down only one part has to be removed and the whole machine 
is not made idle. 
"I guess management is to blame a lot, but not 
altogether. Guilden cutting us off from the jobbers hurt. 
There is something rotten somewhere. 
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"It's not labor. I have always followed my blue-
prints. You can't blame the guy underneath. The foremen 
call in the job masters to find out where they are having 
difficulty. The fault must lie higher up where they aren't 
checked on as are the shop men." 
I'm still fascinated by the machines ••• 
"The factory is a nice place in which to work. You 
ought to come through it when the machines are running. 
I've worlced there twenty-five years and still I stop to 
watch the automatic machines, they are almost human." 
We need somebody to run the place at a profit ••• 
"We've got to get somebody that really wants to run 
the place. Some figure old man Dumaine will get it and run 
it at a profit. Since him the others have only run it to 
get rid of the inventory. I think Mr. Dumaine has the 
influence to get the jobbers back. 
"Get Mr. Boucher, Dumaine's old general manager, 
back in there for five months and he would get things 
straightened out. He was always a tough cookie, but fair. 
"When there were no women around could Boucher swear 
He would really tell you in plain English. Old man Dumaine 
brought him along, taught him the tricks of the trade. 
"Maybe the solution lies in the employees buying the 
company stock. Mr. Cenerazzo told us how Hamilton was in 
our bankrupt position some years ago. He said that today 
the larger part of that company's stock is owned by its 
employees and local businessmen. 
"I only hope that we reopen soon. A lot of folks 
have spent all their years learning the precision work of 
watchmaking. Today they can't get work elsewhere. There 
are a lot worse off than me, and most of them are the older 
employees." 
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CASE 0 
Case 0 started working for The Waltham Watch 
Company in May of 1939 as a "work chaser" in the dial 
department. He stated that he worked under the group 
quota system. "You know what that is, we all did our own 
work and it was credited to all of us. II We really got after 
those in our unit who 'goofed off' too. 
"It wasn't long before I went to a bench where I 
I polished dial figures. We had some new adaptations put in ;1 
li 
there from ideas the company's repr esentatives had stolen \I 
I' 
when they had visited the Bulova factory. 11 
' 'I was laid off in 1940 and did not return t o the 
plant until 1942. I went back to speedometers and did some , 
work on war-time fuses. VVhen I was laid off in October of 
1949 I was still making speedometer cables." 
Dumaine brought in Canadian workers ••• 
"Most of the people you'll talk to will say they 
liked old man Dumaine. Know why? Becau.se they always 
worked! It didn't matter that they were the most under-
paid god damn workers in the country. They worked each 
week and loved the place. 
"He even brought down a bunch of cheap help from 
Canada and paid them only twelve dollars a week. One thing 
about him, no matter how much he screwed you at least he 
came around to pat you on the back." 
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Gu.ilden threw us off balance ••• 
"You know, of course, that Guilden was married to 
Bulova's daughter ~ctually Guilden married Bulova's 
sister]. He was on the outs with Bulova at the time and 
vowed that he would get back to him through Waltham. He 
wasn't a man of good faith. He conspired with Zenith, a 
Swiss concern, to make our factory an assembly plant for 
Swiss watches with the Waltham name on them. 
"He told Ford that we were watchmakers, not speed-
ometer makers, when Ford offered us one-half his speed-
. II ometer business.. I've always felt that the speedometer 
tl income was •business in Spain'; you know, nice to have 
1: d around. There were times when the 'speed' was up and the 
,, 
.I 
watch business was down and vice versa. Vfhen Guilden 
threw out the speedometer business he lost this balance. 
You know that the Ford business kept about four hundred 
· employees going to fill his order of three thousand units 
a day. 11 
0 then continued: 
nAfter letting the speedometers go, Guilden started 
to make a real good watch to compete with the Swiss. I 
understand, incidently, that he wanted to make a personal 
profit of one dollar on each watch the factory turned out. 
nGuilden sold the watches direct, cutting out the 
jobbers who had done a hell. of a selling job. You see, the 
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jobbers had previously bought all the watches Dumaine had 
made. They also had absorbed all kick-backs and repairs. 
"When Guilden came the union built him up to the 
I! 
sky. It's true he did have wonderful connections with the I 
trade. I don't kno·w. I was just one of the guys and can't >! 
say too much about the man." 
Johnson had a reputable name ••• 
"Mr. Johnson came to us with a reputable name he had 1 
made with, I think, the Bell Aircraft Company. He was a 
good guy, but didn't know watches. 
"Everything went well for a while and then the world 1: 
came down on him. He didn't have enough capital to meet 
the working payroll. Some employees went for two or three 
weeks without getting paid. 
They turned the key on Hager ty ••• I I 
sur- r\ "John Hagerty was an excellent finance man. He 
rounded himself with good executives. Men like Teniah 
Sachs, who presently is pushing the stockholders reorgan-
ization plan, and Lee Cherade, who was in charge of manu-
facturing. The latter came out of retirement to accept the 
job as a challenge to his ability. 
"We were on the way back. I think another month 
would have cleared up the situation. But that's when the 
RFC turned the lock on us. 
Cenerazzo worked out okay. 
:1 
138 
I 
II il 
i 
II 
I: 
I' 
,I 
il 
i! 
I 
I 
" 
II 
I 
!j j, 
I' 
II 
I 
I 
"When Walter Cenerazzo came I was working for a 
rubber company in the city. One of his stooges called and 
wanted me to go along with him. Walter worked out okay. 
He got us some pay raises, but the war also helped us earn 
those wage boosts. I even became one of the editors of 
the union magazine, The American Watch Worker. 
"Mr. Dumaine was suggestive to his ideas. I think 
the reason he did cooperate was the fact that he was get-
ting out. He didn't want no blood on his hands." 
A better labor force than most ••• 
"We had a highly-skilled, highly-intelligent working 1' 
force, unlike most labor. Most of the workers kids were 
college graduates too. 
"I '11 admit that the finishing end was a bit jealous 
of the 'speed' room because of our higher pay. I don't 
think they had no right to bitch against the manufacturing 
end of the factory. We didn't consider them to be watch-
makers, only assemblers." 
The company made mistakes, a lot of them ••• 
"For one thing they kept one set of books for both 
the 'speed' and watch sections. They need separate books 
in these divisions. 
"I'd say that 
they have got on the 
Then they won't be screwing things up. 
another cause of trouble would be that 
1
: 
heavy side with the administrative I' 
payroll since Dumaine left. 
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"Another thing, when we were working on the group 
system the foremen often cheated us on 'break down time'. 
That is when our machines broke down we were supposed to 
be credited with an hourly rate during the shutdown. At 
any rate, Cenerazzo did away with the group system. 
"Then we went on piece work rates. My pay jumped 
from an average of a dollar and a quarter an hour to about 
twice that figure. I then started to make eighty to 
dollars a week, which I should have been getting all 
ninety
11 
I 
along. 1 
II 
Under the piece work rate our break down time also started 
to count. 
"Naturally the company began to bitch when they saw 
our pay go up like it did. However, they had set the 
rates, hadn't they? What they really needed was to retime I 
us. He (Cenerazzo) finally did allow us to be retimed. It il 
really was the only fair thing to do." 
Where does the solution lie? 
"we•ve got to put a moratorium on Swiss watches for 
three years anyway, to let the American watch industry get 
on its feet. I don't think the stockholders want Dumaine 
back. Their plan, if accepted, would go into effect 
immediately. If Dumaine were to take over it would require 
an individual vote by each of the stockholders. That might 1 
take sixty days. 
tti don't think Dumaine will get the factory. I have ' 
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no use for him. He is eighty-five, but his mind is as good 
as yours and mine. His boys are a couple or good eggs." 
As for me ••• 
"I don't give a damn if I ever work there again. 
I've got five kids and things haven' t got tough yet. I've 11 
been working part-time at the horse and dog tracks. What 
I'd like to do is get an athletic position at Brandeis, 
you know, the new college that opened up in Waltham." 
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Case P was employed by the Waltham Watch Company for : 
approximately two and one-half years • . Born at Boston on 
May 14, 1913, and a graduate of Harvard College, he had 
I 
I· 
worked as a stockbroker in New York prior to World War II. 1 
He served with the Navy during the war, then "lived in and I 
around Boston" after discharge from the Service. 
In February, 1946, he applied for employment with 
the Waltham Watch Company. 
Opening and closing the ear pieces of his shell-
framed glasses as he spoke, he related his introduction to 
the Waltham firm: 
"Guild.en (Ira c.) was president and Boucher (I.E.) 
was general manager when · I got there. I remember I went 
into the place and saw the personnel director--a fellow 
named Hackett (E.S.). I told him I wanted to work for 
them in the personnel department. He took me up to see 
Boucher, and Boucher hired me." 
I 
Case P described his tenure with Waltham Watch as I 
being divided into two parts. The first half of his em- II 
ployment with the company was served in the personnel I 
department as assistant employment manager. The second 
half was divided between a business training course at 
Harvard and work in the Time Study department at Waltham • 
He explained it in this manner: 
li:2 
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"At the end of the first half of my stay, I went to 
the bu~iness school at Harvard for a session called 'Ad-
vanced Management Course.' I asked them (Waltham) to 
send me, and they sponsored me. It was a full-time course, 
I 
and I wasn't with the company at all during that time. 1 
When I went back, I went into the Time Study department, I 
which was where I was working when I left in July, 1948." II 
When Case P first was employed by Waltham in Febru- 1, 
ary, 1946, Ira C. Guilden was president of the company. 
However, the respondent termed Guilden an "absentee presi- II 
dent" and said he was unfamiliar with the personality of I 
the man. 
I 
Case PI 
pointed out. "Boucher was the management as far as any of I 
"We didn't know much about him at my level,'' 
I 
i 
us in operation end of the factory were concerned. He 
(Boucher) was the operational head. Guilden was more in 
I 
the sales and financial end of it." I 
The subject continued on to stress the importance of !l 
Boucher's influence on the Waltham Watch Company. 
"He wasn't hard on me, but then we didn't have any 
dealings. He was a peculiar person in many ways. One of 
his quirks was that he considered a college education a 
waste of money. I personally think Hackett sold him on 
the idea of my going to the business school. But they 
didn't pay me while I was studying at Harvard. The GI Bill 
1 
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paid the freight, and it didn't cost them a nickel. I 
don't think Boucher would have been willing to do it on 
any other bas is." .i 
Case P later attributed the decline of Waltham Watch 
partially to the shortcomings of top management, and the 
personal traits of Boucher were presented as cause for 
passiveness among superintendents and foremen. The re-
spondent explained it in this way: 
ttrrhe top _level of management and the next level 
under it were not all top grade. Boucher seemed to like 
having around himself people whom he could boss. Many of 
them were workers who were brought up through the ranks. 
He seemed afraid of getting pushed off his pedestal by 
people who might call his number." 
Case P continued: 
"He liked nothing better than getting his foremen 
and superintendents around him iri a circle and publicly 
bawling them out. The foremen were kicked around by the 
I! 
superintendents, who were in turn kicked around by Boucher. \ 
I 
The workers, my hunch is, looked upon all of them with 
pity." 
The respondent reached his conclusion: 
"The morale of management was rotten--perfectly 
rottenl That's why he (Boucher) didn't get the work out 
of them. Anyone was afraid to come to him with the 
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smallest suggestion." 
Case P was high in praise of the cooperation which 
existed between the personnel department and the employee 
union at Waltham. He described the impartial representa-
tion which was allowed in disputes which arose: 
11When a grievance came up to personnel, the worker 
would be there, the union would be there, the worker's 
steward would be there, and Hackett would be there. I 
myself often represented the Time Study department because 
I often made the time study which was being questioned. 
11The relationship between Hackett and McNally (Ray), ' 
the -union representative, was always excellent. I once 
heard Hackett say that he would just as soon have McNally 
sitting in defending the company's side as being against 
it. He considered McNally that fair-minded." 
Since there was large percentages of employees over 
45 years of age at Waltham, Case P, as a personnel man~ 
was asked if there was an age limit for the hiring of 
workers. 
"There was no limit. If a person was one hundred 
and twenty years old and could do the work~ he was hired. 
r I don't think the preponderance of older people had any 
~~ adverse effects. There were some who couldn't pull their 
weight, but that's not important enough to put down as a 
factor." 
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In that Case P was involved in various time studies 
made throughout the Waltham plant, the interviewers asked 
if there had been any noticeable employee reaction to such 
production investigations. 
"They never complained to me when I was taking a 
time study," he said. "In most cases they seemed anxious 
to have the study, especially when they themselves request- 1 
ed it. They often thought the piece rate was too low and 
asked for a time study." 
I 
In explaining his opinions of the time studies, Case ~, 
ll 
I 
P brought forth the following fact regarding the union's 
attitude towards one phase of the research: 
"They (the union) were reluctant to have us do time 
studies in the speedometer department. I understand that 
Cenerazzo (Walter W.) himself did not want a real study in , 
the speedometer room for some reason. We did, however, 
take a few in the speedometer end, but I forget how they 
came out now. '11here were some politics involved there." 
The respondent disclosed that the union did "some 
blocking" on time studies by not allowing the use of a 
stop watch in the tests. He could not explain the union's 
resistance to stop watches, since the policy "predated" 
his arrival at the company. But he did explain the effect 
on results: 
"That meant that we didn't get a real, scientific 
I 
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time study. It meant we were only timing an entire opera- J 
tion, and not the various elements composing the entire 11 
operation. This didn't allow us to time study for improve- il 
II 
menta in those elements. So our time studies almost were 
misnomers in the real sense. 
"But I think they were valuable anyv1ay. We did get 
some idea of how long the different operations took and 
what they were worth in dollars and cents. I don't think 
Boucher had too high an opinion of them. They (Dumaine 
and Boucher) probably didn't use time studies at Amoskeag 
twenty years ago, so they figured 'why use them now'? A 
personnel department to his mind only screened and hired 
people when they were needed." 
He elaborated on employee benefits derived from i\ such II 
'I 
studies: 
"It often happened that the wages were hiked as a 
result of the time studies, and that's why the workers 
accepted them more gladly. We were fair. If there was a 
:, 
I beef about a cut, we'd time it again. And if it came to 1 
a grievance 1 the union was always fair in understanding the il 
reasons." I 
II 
il 
Case P disclosed that efforts were made to place 
"more and more people on piece work." However, the fact 
II 
that many employees doubled as job masters made it difficult!! 
to compute both piece work and hourly pay, the subject 
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said. He added: "I'm sure there was money lost there 1 
and I'm sure some employees took advantage of this diffi-
culty." 
The Waltham Watch Company changed presidents in the 
summer of 1948. Said the subject: 
"Guilden had been eased out and a fellow by the name ! 
of Johnson (Paul P.), who had been one of the top execu-
tives at the Thompson Products Company, came in and took 
I 
I 
I 
I! 
his job and, to some extent, that of Boucher's--the on-the- 1 
spot supervision. Guilden had been an absentee president. 1 
A fellow named Barker was made general manager, and Boucher \: 
left." I 
/I 
Case P left the Waltham Watch Company in July, 1948, I, 
II 
and he attributed his departure to the obviousness of the 1\ 
I 
firm's early failure. His resignation coincided with the 'i 
company's mid-summer shutdown for what was called "re-
tooling." 
"Retooling!" exclaimed Case P. "In my opinion at 
the time that was not the reason. I understood they had 
watch movements amounting to about two hundred thousand 
watches in the vaults. They considered that too much in-
ventory and wanted to convert them into cash without put-
ting out for work. 
"I got out of there because I thought it was going 
to fold. Johnson had it then, and there was no talk of RFC ,I 
II 
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or anything. I don't think they talked about it (the 
financial condition) much, but you heard it rumored around 
top management. Sometimes when you make a guess, you're 
right. And I was right!" 
Case P stated emphatically that he did not believe 
union demands for continued production during the crisis 
period had anything to do with the company's final "down-
fall." He said that employee morale appeared good and that \! 
there was no apparent increase in the number of grievances •
1
\ 
In speaking of the union, Case P had the following il 
to say about the personality of Walter w. Cenerazzo, the 
union president: 
"You'd have to see him to believe himJ He is an 
extraordinary person--very dynamic and opinionated. But 
with very good opinions. One of his flaws is impatience, 
and it might be attributed to his ability to think faster 
than the common person. And in my opinion he is vain! 
"He seemed to have the feeling that herWas more 
important than anybody in the factory and what he said 
I 
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should have gone. He almost had Boucher believing it, 
il 
too. , 
"He did bring about some wage increases. But they 
I 
I 
. I 
were not inordinate increases judging from the country as a 1 
I' 
whole. I think there were only two ten per cent boosts 
since the war, and that's not high." 
vVhen Case P left Waltham, he returned to the Navy as : 
I 
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an officer and trained reservists. He served with the 
from January, 1949, to February, 1950, and watched the 
eventual bankruptcy at Waltham from a distance. 
"It was a shame because I do think they tried to 
make an excellent watch after the war," he says now. "They ' 
II 
had a good labor force, too. In my opinion--and simply 1 
from the people who did know something about it--obsolete 
machinery and machinery in poor repair were not factors in 
the fall of Waltham." 
What, then, were the important factors to his mind? I 
"Well. I think the blame can be put on management 
, !I 
as opposed to the claim that it was labor's fault. Except, 
of course, in the speedometer department where I do think 
the union blocked introduction of time studies and a neces-
sary speed-up. But only a small part of the dollar was 
spent on speedometers. 
. 1\ 
"As for Swiss competition, I don't think the selling ;
1 
I 
of a watch and the getting of money for it was the problem il 
at Waltham. I don't believe the management had progressive ! 
and sound accounting. They couldn't tell where they needed 
to apply modern methods of scheduling and production 
control--where I think the big difficulty layl Their 
accounting methods were not detailed enough." 
Case P pointed out that Waltham had operated a pro-
duction control office which attempted to streamline the 
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flow of manufacturing, but "they were working in the dark 
because their accounting never gave them a true picture." 
He condemned the strenuous duties which kept foremen 
from being efficient executives. 
"The foremen and assistant foremen were hard-worked ' 
guys. They couldn't pay attention to the details of ordin-
ary administration. They were expediters, and they should-
n't have been. They sat right in the rooms when they 
should have had offices at the ends of the rooms. They 
were not executives as they should have been." 
He believed the retail jewelers resented the switch 
from "jobbers" to company retailers. He said he had talked ll 
to several jewelers about the alteration in policy, and he 
offered the following illustration of an incident: 
"A jeweler once told me that a Waltham salesman eame 1 
in and showed him a ease of watches--but they were dummiesl 
Apparently they had some trouble with them disappearing in 
the salesmen's hands. The jeweler himself was disgusted, 
because he couldn't tell anything about the quality of the 
watches. He only saw the eases." 
Where does the "road back" for Waltham lie? 
"You're certainly not going to solve their problem 
by government con.trol and government money. Needless to 
say, they need money. But I think there is a market for 
Waltham watches if the fall of the company hasn't injured 
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the name. 
"The solution is better management in every way. 
!( 
ij 
II 
It ! 
must include a thorough time study job, better production I 
planning in flow and accounting, rearrangement of rooms, 
and so on. They were never hampered by the union in this 
respect. There was one bright man named Jim Driscoll who 
might have straightened things out, but he didn't get 
enough assistance." 
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Case P concluded by pin-pointing the critical period.! 
II 
"It all goes back to Boucher, who apparently didn't !I 
believe anything was important but how many watches you got 
1
1 
out in an hour." ,, 
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CHAPTER III 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
I. THE SUMMARY 
I 
The internal public relations of an industry such as 1 
the Waltham Watch Company is a paramount factor in deter-
mining rates of production, quality of product, and morale 
of the employees. Public relations within any industry 
serves to supply the information, understanding and good 
I 
will which mould the attitudes o~ workers. These attitudes . 
I become influential elements in shaping the diligence with 
which an employee applies himself to the job, and it is not '' 
unfair to assume that the productivity of a company is 
vitally controlled by the attitudes prevalent among its 
personnel. 
Daniel Katz and Herbert Hyman, in their article 
entitled "Morale in War Industries," explained this inter-
relation: 
"Like other social processes, there is a circular 
causal relation between morale and production. Good pro-
duction gives men a feeling of accomplishment and leads to 
increased effort .•• If Production ~s going well, if his 
superiors treat him fairly, if promotional opportunities 
are good, if earnings are satisfactory, if the health and 
safety conditions in the factory are superior, then job 
satisfaction will be high.nlO 
lOoaniel Katz and Herbert Hyman, "Morale in War 1 
Industries," Readings in Social Psychology (New York: Henry · 
Holt and Com anx, 1947I;_P- . 447 =====---==== 
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The intensive biographical interviewing done for I 
this study gave evidence of a keen awar.eness among employees! 
of such values as productivity, personal treatment, oppor-
tunity, earnings, and health and safety conditions in the 
Waltham Watch Company. The attitudes of the responding 
Waltham workers regarding these various morale factors 
generally were similar in that they revealed a consistency 
of pride in the company and devotion to their work. It is 
important to note that the divergency of opinion appeared 
most frequently in regard to management. The consensus of 
attitudes found in the interviews made for the study in-
I dicated that the Waltham Watch Company placed emphasis on 1 
I' 
I factory cleanliness, and this fact, combined with a normally11 
satisfactory wage and considerate treatment, developed an 
esprit de corps for which the Waltham workers pride them-
selves. 
Regardless of the oft mentioned "one-family" spirit 
which prevailed among the workers themselves, the public 
relations man cannot but note the extreme lack of informa-
tion, or acquisition of misinformation, which prevailed in 
workers' attitudes regarding the plans and policies of 
management. Many of the expressed opinions, based on rumor 
and hearsay, vividly illustrate the necessity for the use of 
tl 
reliable connnunication channels between top executives and I, 
the watchworker at the bench. It is interesting to consider!! 
I 
I 
! 
I 
i 
r 
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that managers such as Ezra C. Fitch and Frederic c. 
·. 
' 
Dumaine, whose on-the-job supervision of operations brought !I 
them into personal contact with employees, enjoyed more II 
i 
favorable attitudes than did the postwar executives--Ira c. 1, 
Guilden, Paul P. Johnson, and John Hagerty. This factor of II 
. il 
:I 
personal associations between boss and worker will be 
treated at length later in the chapter. 
The interviews taken covered, for the most part, the 11 
time periods embraced by the managements of Fitch, Dumaine 
and the 1944-50 presidencies of Guilden, Johnson and 
· 11 
Hagerty. Company policies underwent considerable changes 
as each new president introduced his personality and method 
1
, 
of operation onto the scene. Fitch was an experienced 
watch salesman who possessed mechanical skill and a lcnowl-
e.d g e of the trade. Dumaine, a financial capitalist, de-
manded economy above all else. Guilden was primarily noted ! 
for being a marketing man. Johnson's chief interest lay in 
I 
the production field. Hagerty was essentially a politic ian !I 
with little knowledge of the trade. Thus as the attitudes 
of the Waltham employees shaped under this diversity of 
managements, the public relations student can envisage how 
each type of executive influenced the attitudes of the 
individual employee and how antagonis tic attitudes might 
have been alleviated by proper information and communica-
tiona. 
II 
- . Jl==r---== -------
I! 
II 
II 
155 
[, 
II I -
II 
II 
Ji 156 
-=- -= = --==-- -===--~=---,-~--=--=-=-~ ~=-~=----"--'= =- ---- - ___ j ___ -
- -------n-----
,1 
,, 
President Fitch's personality might be considered !1 
as having been his best public relations. It is apparent I 
in the interviews tha t the employees acquainted with the II 
Fitch era at Waltham were deeply impres~ed by the kindlinesJ 
of Waltham's chief executive, although alongside this favo~l 
II able opinion ran antagonistic attitudes regarding the short11 
comings of the son, Conover Fitch. A constant restatement 
of the fact that accessibility to "old man" Fitch's ac-
quaintance was a matter of considerable ease for the line 
I 
workers. In fact, the apparent benevolence of the presiden~~ 
had characteristics which has had its merit debated at I 
length as a community relations problem. I I 
I 
The factor of worker security first became apparent 11 
from those subjects who recollected experiences under 
President Fitch. The retention of favorable opinions re-
garding the former management was framed with the obvious 
fact in mind that unemployment was unknown during that 
period. The paternalism of Ezra Fitch, whose desire to 
keep his employees busy at their benches in spite of 
declining sales and a rocketing inventory, probably had 
much to do with the inevitable financial collapse which 
came to a head in 1921. The individual worker did not 
seem to realize the long-run effects of his steady employ-
ment. Only the present moment was of importance to him. 
il 
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Fitch's concern for the welfare and recreation of :I 
!I 
his workers was pointed out by the respondents who recalled !1 
I 
the employees' Riverside Club and the departmental dances 
which flourished during his ownership. It is of interest 
to note that with the arrival of Dumaine on the Waltham 
scene the club was dismantled and the company dances were 
discontinued. 
There is much to be seen when one evaluates the 
Fitch management in view of the fact that no amount of 
public relations activity as such can compensate for in-
efficiency or lack of foresight on the part of top execu-
tives. Ezra Fitch's kindliness and consideration continue 
to be lauded by those who knew him. The Waltham timepiece 
manufactured during his era was almost unchallenged for 
leadership in precision made watches. However, regardless 
of the good will apparent both inside and outside of the 
Waltham gates, mismanagement was destined to destroy the 
Fitch regime. 
Frederic Dumaine arrived at Waltham in 1923 to 
inaugurate an economy drive which was later to retire the 
company's $8 1 000 1 000 debt. Efficiency and cost-cutting 
were his primary objectives, and one of his first steps was 
II 
'I I, 
to make a readjustment of wages. The impact of his policies'! 
on the opinions of the employees was not slight, and it has :1 
been contended by Vincent Carosso that this intrusion on 
157 
The strike again affords an insight into the value 
of acquainting personn~l with facts and policies about 
which they apparently have no knowledge. 
The Waltham employees sensed the element of fairness 
I 
among Dumaine '1s qualities as they review his economic poli..; 1 
cies today. Case A of~ered the most consistent attitude ·I 
.j 
regarding Dumaine in stating: "He was a · hard task master, 
but he was honest, on-the-level and paid you what you were 
worth." 
Although he did curtail most of the employee group 
activities, it is evident that he retained personal con-
tacts with his help. Evidence has been recorded ~f his 
close relationship with his foremen, superintendents and 
other workers. As far as the public relations within the 
company itself, Dumaine had the foresight to select a 
well-liked assistant superintendent and city official to 
represent the firm in Jts community relations. 
The presidents who succeeded Dumaine and composed 
the three managements which existed between 1944 and Feb-
ruary, 1950, were--judging from the interviews conducted--
unfamiliar personalities whose policies were incomprehensi-
1 ble to the Waltham workers. There was an unfaltering dis- I 
trust for Ira C. Guilden, whose alleged associations with \ 
Swiss interests were repeated with impressive consistency I 
by the respondents. 
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It is apparent that Guilden's popularity within the 
company suffered for want of better internal public rela-
tions. A marketing man and a disciple of advertising's 
power~ Guilden launched a $500,000 publicity campaign to 
put Waltham watches before the public. Meanwhile~ within 
the Waltham plant, rumors grew and spread during his 
absentee ownership about his supposed intentions, as Case K 
put it, "to do a job on the place so the Swiss can come in 
and pick it up." The respondents' charges were admittedly 
based on hearsay and assumptions. A notable example of an 
instance where communications might have afforded workers 
insight into Guilden's intentions occured when he attempted 
to purchase Swiss machines in order to bolster lagging 
Waltham production. The attitudes of the workers showed a 
distrust for the purchase of Swiss machines and parts since 
they feared their own security was being jeopardized be-
cause they manufactured much of their own machinery. His 
previous connection with Waltham's competitor, and assemblenl 
of Swiss movements, the Bulova Watch Company, apparently 
I 
served to strengthen their suspicions. 1 
Guilden apparently lost much prestige with the 11 
workers when he introduced himself to the company with vast 
promises of expansion which neither his sales force nor the I 
reconverting production units could fulfill. There were I 
frequent instances of his promises being recalled by the 
I 
li 
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respondents. The fact that he followed these pledges by 
reducing production of speedometers and custom parts 
without explanation caused the workers seemingly to lose 
faith in him at the outset. 
The attitudes uncovered in this study bared a mis-
trust of Guilden, but, at the same time, laid bare the 
forementioned lack of knowledge about the true character-
istics of the man. 
For instance, Case D said: "Ask ten men about them 
,! 
'I ! 
I 
I (Guilden and Johnson) and you' 11 get ten di f ferent yarns •• ·'j' 
"He wanted to sell Waltham to a Swiss company ••• ", 
testified Case E. 
"This fellow Guilden--I don't know what to say about
1 
him," confessed Case F. 
"Guilden wasn't there long enough for me to draw an 
opinion. From what I unders t a nd ••• " and Case K continued 
on to condemn him. 
The preceding are a few examples of the suppositions ij 
which Waltham employees set forth concerning Ira. c. 
Guilden. His over-all managerial intentions are not to ·be 
considered in this study. However, his absence from the 
Waltham Company itself and his apparent refusal to orien-
tate his employees regarding his many executive decisions 
presents a situation which should benefit the student of 
public relations. The uninformed employee often allows ·I 
.I 
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natural suspicion of the unknown to misguide him, and this 
condition results in a weakening of confidence and morale. 
The respondents indicated that Paul P. Johnson did 
I 
not suffer the wave of resentment, suspicion, and criticism 
I 
which Guilden had endured. Regardless, President Johnson 
apparently continued to ignore the potentialities of inter- 1 
I 
nal public relations, if we are to judge from the expressed ! 
attitudes. The consensus of opinions would indicate that 
the Waltham employees did not understand the reorganization 
which Johnson desired within the company's production set-
up. They also did not understand that continued opera-
tions-~at a time when Johnson felt temporary closure was 
the most appropriate remedy--would only perpetuate 
bankruptcy. 
Said Case E: 
"I've heard some of the men say that if they'd i 
go ahead with his plans, we wouldn't
1 
allowed Mr. Johnson to 
have wound up where we did." 
Attitudes recorded showed that John Hag~rty was not 
held in high esteem by Waltham workers, the main charges 
being against his political affiliations and ignorance of 
the watchmaking craft. 
The attitudes regarding the managements of Guilden, 
Johnson, and Hagerty displayed a need for communication 
channels between the top executives and the employees. In 
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that the workers expressed an unfaltering faith in the 
activities of the Waltham union, it is important to note 
that the union's grasp on the confidence of its members 
probably is greatly enhanced by the policy of union 
officials to supply reliable information quickly down the 
line. 
A union executive informed the interviewers that 
Walter w. Cenerazzo emphasizes the value of communication 
II 
I 
channels. But, Cenerazzo insists that no unfounded rumors I 
be permitted to flow through these channels since he right- 'I 
ly realizes that the employee confidence now possessed 
would be undermined as a result. 
"As . soon as we got any information, the union 
executives would call a meeting of the union stewards who 
would then pass it on to their own departments," the union 
official explained. He added tha t the union information 
often preceded company announcements by several days. 
Also a probable cause in the disruption of adequate 
communication lines within the company is the fact that 
foremen were the links between management and the workers. 
Case P contended that multiplicity of duties grea.tly over-
worked the foremen and, this being true, it is possible 
that improper attention was given to this vital factor due 
to lack of time. 
The chain reaction in sagging morale and little 
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faith in the calibre of management reappeared at frequent 
intervals in the interviews. There were several instances 
where subjects offered the opinions that the Waltham sales I! 
.I 
jl 
force was inadequate to the task after distribution of 
watches had been taken away from ttjobbers." There is a 
keen awareness of the damage done Waltham's reputation 
among the jewelry trade itself by the half price sale 
staged by President John Hagerty. 
Evident in the interviews were several allegations 
concerning a decline in the quality of the Waltham watch. 
Although the respondents generally upheld the workmanship 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
! 
'I in Waltham pr·oducts, the subjects mentioned such production II 
shortcomings as poor grade steel in mainsprings., rejected j' 
work being put into watches, a "lemon" watch numbered six- : 
seventy-five, and ttdays when the pallets will be all off.u 
Case E charged that a "don't care" attitude among younger 1
1 workers impaired the quality of the watches. It is impera-  
I 
II il 
tive that the public relations student comprehend the · 
effects which such actions might have on morale in the I' 
I plant as well as community relations for the factory itself~ 
'I 
,I There are several instances of inter-departmental 
jealousy and distrust. Several of the interviewed employeoo j 
I 
stated that there was ill-feeling existing between the 1 
manufacturing and the finishing sections of the plant. De- :j 
pending upon which department the respondent was working in,, 
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he favored his own group. Case 0 stated that the manufac-
turing section did not consider the finishers as watch-
makers, only assemblers. Those in the finishing section 
based _their importance upon the fact that without them the 
watches would never be completed. The significance of this 
jealousy lies in the fact that the executives were unaware 
of its existence or perhaps only disinterested in allevi-
ating it. 
Evidence has been presented which contends that the 
older employees had a stronger loyalty to the company. 
This dichotomy between the old and new workers were ex-
pressed by one respondent when she said that the younger 
girls were working too fast and sacrificing quality for 
speed. 
A very significant factor, if not the most signifi-
cant one of this paper, lies in the attitude of the worker 
toward the union. Most employees, even its most ardent 
supporters today, doubted that the initial attempt to 
organize the plant would succeed. It was noted in the 
II (I 
I 
I 
i 
I interviews that even the non-union men and women acknowl- : 
edge that the union had accomplished much. I It is surpris ingl' 
however, that many of its staunchest supporters felt that II I 
the union received credit for pay boosts which were a result\ 
of the over-all wartime wage spiral. 
Many of the employees have turned to the union and 
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the union president as the most important entities in the 
factory today. No one doubts that Walter Cenerazzo is 
capable and willing to accept .this opinion of his organi-
zation and himself. Lacking a paternalistic Fitch or a 
"back-patting" Dumaine, it is only logical that the workers 
·r 
should have turned to their successor, Guilden, as the 
personality who had taken over their company. The absentee II 
management of Guilden did not allow for the successful 
passing on of this ownership identification with the em-
ployees. Today we find the Waltham worker turning not to 
management, but to the union, with his grievance or appeal 
for recognition. There is little doubt that much of the 
I' strength of the union is based upon the failure of Guilden II 
or his successors to take the place of Fitch or Dumaine in 
the eyes of the workers. 
The attitudes recorded also reveal a public rela-
tions failure by the Federal government. There was 
criticism of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for 
refusal to hurriedly assist Waltham as the bankruptcy 
shutdown of February, 1950, approached. Assuming that the 
RFC based its decision not to render further aid to the 
I 
I' .I 
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watch company on sound reasons, it is obvious that by making
1 
no clear statement of its stand on the matter the govern- 1\ 
ment subsequently received unfortunate public relations. 
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afforded critics of government policy ready material for 
condemnation of RFC • 
The charges against the Federal government went 
further with recurrent complaints that Swiss competition 
was propagated by reciprocal trade agreements and low 
tariffs. The vast majority of the respondents insisted 
that tariffs must be reimposed on Swiss imports. Explain-
ing the government's stand on recl.procal tariffs requires 
a huge public relations task for the government, with 
emphasis placed on informing the public of the merit and 
necessity of the trade program. Of course, attitudes of 
Waltham employees are shaped in light of the fact that 
they are jobless as low-priced Swiss watches saturate the 
market, which establishes a solid wall of bitterness 
against which such a government program must be charted. 
It becomes apparent that a public relations program 
might well profit importers of foreign watches and parts. 
Three plans are now being heard in Federal Court 
for reorganization of the Waltham Watch Company. One of 
these plans has been submitted by the Bulova 1Natch Company, 
and the absence of a public relations program on Bulova's 
part may be greatly responsible for the fear which pervades 
the minds of jobless Waltham personnel. It is clear that 
Bulova has not convincingly made clear its intentions with 
regard to the Waltham property. Should Bulova obtain 
167 
control of Waltham, then an internal public relations 
program would seem necessary to alleviate the suspicion 
which now exists. 
The main fear at Waltham is that the company will 
be turned into an assembly plant for Swiss imports. 
II. THE CONCLUSIONS 
On the basis of investigations carried out in this 
study, the attitudes expressed by responding employees of 
the Waltham Watch Company bear out the following conclu-
sions: 
(1) A strong sense of pride existed on the part of 
the employees with regard to the company and its products. 
(2) The management of Ezra c. Fitch enjoyed excel-
lent public relations within the company itself, although 
' 
I 
the personal traits of Fitch and the uninhibited atmosphere :~ 
which existed verged on the paternal. 
(3) Frederic c. Dumaine, who insisted on the most 
production at the minimal cost, displayed that immediate 
public disfavor such as he endured mAy have favorable long- !. 
run results. His system of management now is declared as 1 
I 
superior to that of Fitch by employees who worked under r 
both. \1 
II (4) Guilden's absenteeism and lack of communications 'I 
with his workers (in contrast to Fitch's and Dumaine's close1 
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contact with the bench workers) allowed rumors and half-
truths to run rampant with regard to his management. 
(5) The attitudes of Waltham employees now are 
better controlled by union use of communications channels 
symbols of chief authority at the Waltham Watch Company. 
(8) The morale at Waltham was affected by the poor 
results of the company sales staff after distrib~tion was 
removed from the "jobbers." Also, there was evidence of 
lost confidence in some of the products themselves. 
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(9) Recent events have shaken 
il 
li 
the faith of Waltham's p 
employees in the Federal government. There is a need for a ll 
more vigorous public relations program by government 
agencies. 
(10) There is a need to educate the employees with 
regard to technological advancements, including operations 
which involve the use of Swiss machinery. 
(11) There is a definite fear of Swiss interests 
assuming control of the Waltham Watch Company. 
(12) The employees' attitudes concerning the strike 
of 1924 are now devoid of reasons for the walkout. 
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(13) There was minor evidence of older employees 
believing that younger personnel are less loyal to the 
company and less efficient in work standards. 
(14) Generally, there is a tendency for mistrust 
and suspicion to be propagated by lack of information or 
misunderstanding. This demands remedy by better public 
relations and information programs within the company itsel 
through carefully conceived communications channels. 
I 17o 
\ 
c~i==~--=-=-
I 
,I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
1\ 
I 
,I 
I, 
II 
I 
I! 
II 
I 
,. 
I. 
CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS V'ffi iCH RELATE TO PUBLIC REL.~TIONS IN GENERAL 
This study has revealed that employees of the com-
pany are keenly aware of the achievements or shortcomings 
of the management under which they worked. They closely 
II 
I 
I 
!I II 
associate themselves with the executive officers who 
t he company policies. Therefore, it becomes a vital 
direct ;! 
part I 
I 
of internal public relations within any industry for manage-' 
ment to attempt to reciprocate this interest--to encourage 
the downward flow, as well as the upward channeling of 
communications between executive officers and the employees I· 
I 
on the production line. ;[ 
I The employees of the Waltham Watch Company who con-
tributed attitudes to this study reveal that employee loy-
alty and confidence is nurtured by close acquaintance with 
management. The executive who appears in the production 
room and who displays personal interest in the jobs being 
done by employees, as well as an apparent concern for the 
general welfare of his company, is more apt to enjoy the 
II 
II 
,j 
li 
benefits of good public relations both within the firm and I, 
.outside in the community. The absentee, the distant man-
ager can not anticipate the same success. 
Employees of any company develop attitudes about 
circumstances whi ch concern their job security. Management, 
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in hoping for sounder public relations, must understand 
that these attitudes are the result of information which 
munication for reliable and true information. No executive ' 
'I 
officer should overlook this factor of contributing the 
correct facts to his employees, since attitudes effect 
production and morale in the long run. The agency which 
supplies employees with factual answers to their inquiries 1 
will control the subsequent confidence of the workers. 
Confidence among personnel also is advanced by work- 1 
ers' knowledge that management "knows the business" which 
it is oper ating. The Waltham study uncovered several 
charges that certain executives did not know the watch-
making trade. 
It is understandable that executives who are igno-
rant of the operations they attempt to direct are suscep-
tible to this condemnation whenever an employee becomes 
dissatisfied. This allegation can become more pronounced 
in industr i es today as the practice of hiring professional 
management engineers expands. Therefore, it must be urged 
that such executives acquaint themselves with all opera-
tional phases of production and display before their employ-
ees an intense interest in production problems. 
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Finally, a sound internal public relations policy 
within a company is furthered by maintenance of safe and 
sanitary working conditions. Factors such as cleanliness, 
rest periods, and company-sponsored recreational programs 
and events result in a pronounced sense of job and company 
pride. 
Those executives who control a company's public 
relations are comprehending now, more than ever, that good 
public relations commence at home--within their own organi- 11 
zations. The far-sighted manager perceives that the suc-
cess of failure of sound public relations programs depends 
on his knowledge of the means and methods involved. The 
challenge is before the administrator of today. The poten- ~· 
tial benefits of better understanding between management 
and both employees and public are his to achieve or to lose. 
As far as internal public relations within the plant 
are concerned, management's methods are clear-cut. 
between the topmost and lowest levels. He must consider 
each prevailing attitude in the light of its origin, impor-
11 
tance and consequence. 
This study of the Waltham Watch Company has offered 
vivid examples of notable success and unnecessary failure 
in the forementioned phases of public relations. 
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